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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Antoinette S. Ellis for the Master 
of Arts in Education presented May 14, 1986 
Title: An Historical Overview of Creativity with Implications for 
Education 
Dr. v~r-Guy 
This thesis traced the development of the concept of creativity 
from the earliest works in the intellectual history of Western civili-
zation to the late twentieth century. This historical perspective on 
the concept of creativity served as a backdrop to current views of the 
concept and as a reference source for recurrent views of the concept 
and as a reference source for recurrent and essential themes in the 
progressing debates concerning this issue. 
The study proceeded from the evidence of Homeric and early 
philosophical work concerning the lively and real presence in the 
thinking of the times of experiences of "breakthrough" creative 
thought and production. The source of inspiration as external to the 
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creative person and the conflict between the rational and the irra-
tional in creative works were documented in the early Greek period of 
the literature as of central importance to the question of creativity. 
The unfolding of increasingly incisive visions of the source of 
creativity and of issues related to the production of creative works 
were then traced through three more recent historic periods: the 
Italian Renaissance, the eighteenth century European Enlightenment, 
and finally the modern period 1900-1985. Two dimensions of changes in 
thought were of particular importance. The first involved the focal 
point of the source of inspiration. With Renaissance Neoplatonism, 
the source of inspiration was retrieved from externality and located 
within the creative person as pure potentiality to be actualized in 
living. This concept of the internality of creativity was increasing-
ly refined through eighteenth century Cartesian rationalism in France 
and Neoplatonism in England. 
The modern orientation to inspiration has proceeded in the 
direction of deeper penetration into the personal experience of and 
the creative process involved in creativity. The question of ration-
ality vs irrationality, which loomed so large in ancient Greece, re-
treated to a secondary position in the thinking of the Renaissance 
Neoplatonists and of eighteenth century critical writings. With the 
pronouncements of Kant at the end of the eighteenth century, ration-
ality vs irrationality descended out of view as a free-standing 
question or concern for modern times. 
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The modern issues that have swelled across the stage concerning 
creativity have been those of tile creative personality, the question of 
genius, the testing and measurement of creativity and the creative pro-
cess itself. With the intensive focus of modern sights on issues of 
personality, a considerable catalogue of multiple personality traits 
unique to creative persons has emerged leaving education much to absorb 
and ponder. Testing and measurement of creativity has, perhaps, suc-
ceeded in guiding some attention to capacities of creativity among stu-
dents and adults, but it has, to date, failed to provide reliable and 
valid instruments for measuring creativity or creative potential. 
Intellectual or academic giftedness has fared much better in the test-
ing atmosphere of modern times than has creativity which currently may 
really be measurable only by a combination of intelligence, creativity, 
and personality tests. Of particular importance are recent suggestions 
concerning the creative process, most significantly the central process 
stages of incubation and illumination. It may be in these areas that 
the precise and distinct qualities of creativity may be isolated. 
The conclusions deriving from this overview of creativity involve 
three central ideas. (1) There has been and continues to be a confu-
sion between intellectual capacities and creative capacities, with the 
latter most often being subsumed under the former. There is a need for 
an ultimate and clear discrimination between the two. (2) Once focal-
ized, creativity needs, if possible, to be measured and assessed. 
Until a reliable creativity metric has been achieved, however, where 
necessary, a combination of intelligence, creativity, and personality 
/ 
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tests should be used to identify creative students in schools, albeit 
tentatively. (3) As all people have creative capacities to one degree 
or another, it seems that a major objective of education needs to be 
the encouragement of the growth and development of creativity through-
out the entire academic careers of all students. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1950, psychologists and educators alike have focused 
unprecedented attention on the issue of creativity in both the 
professional and the educational spheres of society. While the 
original interest in creativity in modern times resulted from concerns 
immediately within the domains of psychology and education, the 
launching of Sputnik in 1957 galvanized the American nation to the 
need for greater creativity in the country as a whole, particularly in 
the sciences and technology. As a result, schools increased emphasis 
on scientific and mathematics achievement and placed new emphasis on 
the nurturing and development of innovative and creative talents of 
students. In the wake of the cybernetics and computer revolutions in 
the last two decades, the educational emphasis has shifted toward 
technology, in which innovative applications of learning are part of 
the instructional expectation. 
Although in the 1980s education has been vigorously redirected 
toward "excellence" and achievement as assessed by grades and 
standardized tests, the importance of innovative thinking and creative 
problem-solving have remained tacit concerns of teachers and the 
schools. Moreover, business and industry are demanding creative 
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and intellectual breakthroughs to further and continue the unprece-
dented developments in science and technology in the twentieth cen-
tury. It seems clear that to serve national and global interests, 
increased achievement within currently known fields and established 
parameters is not alone what is going to be required for human pro-
gress and world peace. The need for technical and intellectual break-
throughs across the full spectrum of human endeavors has never been 
greater. 
If we must call more upon and therefore foster and encourage the 
creative power of individuals, it would appear that we need a more 
complete understanding of creativity and the factors involved in its 
manifestation. A cursory examination of recent writings concerning 
creativity revealed a confusion about the scope and meaning of the 
term suggesting that further examination of the concept was required. 
Based on previous academic studies in pf1ilosophy and the arts, the 
author hypothesized that creativity was enough of a unique human 
characteristic that some insight may well be gained from an in-depth 
examination of its treatment in the literature of the past. Accord-
ingly, a study and review was undertaken of writers and thinkers of 
antiquity, including Homer and Plato from Hellenic Greece, in order to 
discern their views regarding this distinctively human trait. Follow-
ing this review, the author attempted to trace the development of the 
idea of creativity through two of the most creative eras in Western 
civilization, the Italian Renaissance and the eighteenth century 
European Enlightenment. Finally, the development of the concept 
through the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century to the 
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present was reviewed with special focus on the emerging conceptualiza-
tion of creativity since 1950. While the sources for the review of 
literature from antiquity to 1950 were generally the acknowledged 
scholars in the fields of philosophy, aesthetic criticism, and 
psychology, an ERIC search was conducted to identify significant 
contributions to the literature since 1950. In an effort to achieve 
maximum completeness, this search traced references by 19 "descrip-
tors" and a "free text search" across three academic levels. Twenty-
six Boolean "operators" were used to initiate multiple "overlapping 
term" searches. The search identified 81 journal articles and 87 ERIC 
documents related to this subject. From an overview of these 
materials, key works were identified and reviewed. 
In this present work, the author was able to abstract represen-
tative concepts of creativity and implicit features of the creative 
process as conceptualized throughout the Hestern history of civiliza-
tion. These visions of man's creativity are presented in Chapters II 
and III. This study concludes with an over-all summary, followed by 
conclusions and a discussion of their implications in Chapter IV. 
CHAPTER II 
CREATIVITY--THE DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGENCE OF THE 
MODERN PERSPECTIVE 
The Ancients 
For Western civilization, the essentially human capacity of 
creativity came under its first systematic and problematical explora-
tion in tl1e works of Plato (427-347 BC). The most famous and enduring 
image of great creative talent issuing to us through the centuries 
from the classic Platonic Dialogues is that of the artist who is, at 
once, "inspired" and "out of his mind," graced with supernatural 
powers and toucl1ed with madness. In the early dialogue, "Ion," Plato 
gives his immortal romantic image of the artist or poet in the words: 
" ••. the poet is a light and winged and holy thing,"l followed im-
mediately by a gentle expression of his equally famous hesitation of 
reason: 
••• and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired 
and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: 
when he-ii'as---ri'"ot"a:tta1ned to this state he is ~owerless and is 
unable to utter his oracles (emphasis added). 
For this double-image of creative greatness, Plato did not as-
sume credit of authorship for either himself or his teacher and main 
protagonist, Socrates. Even at the end of his momumental philosophi-
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cal work in which, along with other issues, this duple character of 
creativity is carefully and severely examined, Plato assures his 
reader that this double-view of the poet (or creative genius) is: 
11 
••• according to the tradition that has ever prevailed among us, and 
i s a cc e pt e d o f a 11 men •••• 11 3 
In fact, however, the only part of the image that appears from a 
modern perspective to have a significant ancient heritage is that of 
the grace of vision through divine inspiration itself, not the impli-
cation of senselessness or madness. 
Plato's most immediate source from recognized antiquity was 
Homer (c. 800 BC) whose revered Iliad opens with the poet's appeal to 
divinity for direct inspiration--in fact, for something like immediate 
divine dictation of the epic: 
Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son, Achilleus 
and its devastation, which put pains thousandfold 
upon the Achaians •••• 4 
Although this prologue vrns, in Homer's time, already a formal style of 
opening a grand epic, it was by no means empty form. Throughout the 
heroic tale, Homer charges divinities with his needs for inspiration, 
information and insight. A dramatic example is encountered at the 
midpoint in the epic account when the tensions of military prepara-
tions have reached the breaking point and the Trojans 
whirled about and stood their ground against the Achaians, and 
the Argives against them pulled together their battle lines. 
So the fighting grew close and they faced each other, and 
foremost Agamemnon drove on, trying to fight far ahead of the 
others.5 
Here Homer breaks the narrative with an appeal to higher powers for 
vision: 
Tell me now, you Muses who have your home on Olympus, who was 
the first to come forth and stand against Agamemnon of the 
very Trojans, or their renowned companions in battle.6 
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It is apparent through the Homeric tradition that divine inspi-
ration was not reserved by the poet for his work alone as the pri-
vileged fount of creative verse and vision. In The Odyssey, for 
example, Homer describes the praises given by the hero, Ulysses, to 
the bard, Demodocus, for his singing of "the return of the Achaeans 
with all their sufferings and adventures••? so wonderfully that Ulysses 
believes the bard "must have studied under the Muse, Jove's daughter, 
and under Apollo, 11 8 and Ulysses entreats Demodocus: 
'Now, however, change your song and tell of the wooden horse .••• 
If you will sing this tale aright I will tell all the world 
how magnificantly heaven has endowed you.' 
The bard inspired by heaven took up the story at the 
point where some Argives set fire to their tents .•.• 9 
The gift of creative inspiration was not conceived to be the 
gift of poets alone during this early epoch in Western civilization. 
Even the philosophers prior to Plato were inclined to attribute their 
philosophical insights, in fact their power of philosophical penetra-
tion, to a magical, divine tutelage or inspiration. For example, 
among the extant literary fragments of the pre-eminent Milesian 
philosopher, Parmenides (515-450 BC), are the opening lines of his 
poem, "On Nature," in which he described his enlightenment on a divine 
journey to the "goddess" who assured him, "Thou shalt inquire into 
everything. 11 10 And she continued (Fragment 2): 
'Come, I will tell you--and you must accept my word when you 
have heard it--the ways of inquiry which alone are to be 
thought.•11 
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From there followed the dictation to Parmenides of the treatise on the 
monistic philosophy of Being and the logical primacy of reason. 
As illustrated in the examples of poetic and philosophic thought 
predating Plato, the concept of divine inspiration was widely used to 
account for intellectual insight and poetic vision with relatively 
little scepticism; little else appears to have been available either 
to describe or to account for sudden and powerful breakthroughs of 
human thought or for transporting rhapsodic verse. A viable tradition 
of mystical inspiration as the well-spring of human creativity was 
deeply irnbedded in the cultural tradition by the time Plato began his 
dialogues to commemorate his great teacher, Socrates, and to explore 
more systematically in writing than had yet been achieved the ques-
tions of honor, truth, social law, beauty, love, knowledge and reali-
ty. 
Plato, himself an artist of the prose dialogue as well as a 
powerfully creative philosopher, appeared to be early inclined toward 
a rationalized acceptance of the traditional merit attributed to 
divinely gifted and inspired philosophers, statesmen, and poets, al-
though all but the philosopher were noted to be often unknowing 
(theoretically and rationally) of what they spoke.12 Plato's middle 
and late period dialogues, however, bring under increasingly critical 
examination this non-rational concommitant of inspiration and finally 
culminate in the unavoidable (for Plato's cognitive approach) divided 
image of creative artists who express themselves in highly affective 
but fundamentally inexplicable creations. 
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Although as Dodds suggests in The Greeks and the Irrational, the 
philosopher, Democritus (494-404 BC), must probably be credited with: 
having introduced into literary theory this conception of the 
poet as a man set apart from common humanity by an abnormal 
inner experience, and of poetry as a rey~lation apart from 
reason and above reason (italics mine), ~~ 
Plato's systematic cognitive exploration of poetry and poets along 
with reality and knowledge led him to the most consequential identifi-
cation of creativity with suprarational giftedness in early Western 
philosophy, and this inspite of the fact that Plato linked the 
"divine" inspiration of great creativity with the severe judgement of 
near madness. 
From the beginning, Plato was equivocal about the merits of 
inspired creative expression, as evinced in his key middle dialogue, 
"Apology": 
not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius 
and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who 
also say many things, but do not understand the meaning of 
them.14 
Along with such measured assessments, however, came eulogies in praise 
of poetic transports, such as: 
•.• he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, 
comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple 
by the help of art--he, I say, and his poetry are not admit-
ted; the sane man disappears tgd is nowhere when he enters 
into rivalry with the madman. 
But even these praises do not preclude the coup de grace delivered to 
the free poetic spirit in the greatest of Plato's middle dialogues, 
"The Republic." It is in this dialogue that the irrational element in 
inspired poetic creativity is sentenced to exclusion from the state, 
though with full rites of garland and myrrh.16 Reason and law must 
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prevail in the state under management by Plato's idealistic 
philosophy, and here emotion and the magical powers of the arts, 
including painting and music, must be carefully censored and control-
led. The arts allowed in "The Republic" and later in the State under 
the organization of tr1e "Laws" were limited to those which encouraged 
and exemplified order, vigor and rationality. Form, reason and skill 
took precedence over inspiration, lyricism and emotion: 
.•• if you ..• allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or 
lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind .•. but pleasure 
and pain will be the rulers in our State.17 
Although even in his last monumental dialogue, "Laws," Plato 
acknowledged the elevated status of the creatively gifted and a 
certain reality to abide in their inspired works: 
..• for poets are a divine race and often in their strains, by 
the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth,18 
his convictions regarding the supremacy of ideal and logical truths 
caused him to devalue the rich emotional realities tapped by the 
creatively gifted and to distrust the irrational process, product and 
effects of inspired creativity. This is understandable in con-
sideration of Plato's continuous emphasis on reason and logic as the 
controlling factors in the maintenance of the Republic. The "un-
reasoned" was neither the source nor the goal of the citizens' activi-
ties envisioned by Plato in the State ruled by philosopher kings. 
Ultimately, history suggests Plato's partial rapture with in-
spired creativity marked civilization more deeply than did his 
doubts. The powerful articulation of suprarational inspiration as the 
fountainhead of superlative creativity bore over 20 centuries of 
aesthetic fruit, burgeoning most magnificently in the form of Neo-
platonism in the great Quatrocento Renaissance in Italy. 
The Italian Renaissance 
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Intoxicated with the rediscovered classical vision of man, the 
fifteenth century Italian cities teemed with a vigorous urban life, 
spilling over with business and trade, humanistic studies, orations on 
the dignity of man, and tributes to the rich and the ruling in sculp-
ture, fresco, oil painting and music. Under the sway of court-
centered schools and academies, particularly the Platonic Academy in 
Florence, the Christianized Neoplatonism of such works as Marsilio 
Ficino's Platonic Theolo9y, together with his translations of and com-
mentaries on Plato and Plotinusl9, imbued the invigorated citizenry 
with concepts of rational man as superior to other creatures in his 
power of creativity and self-governing which were conceived as nothing 
less than god-like.20 As Erwin Panofsky suggests, the Neoplatonic 
movement igniting in the Florentine Platonic Academy with Ficino's 
philosophical leadership caught on 11 1 i ke wil dfi re--a movement the 
impact of which can be compared, in range and intensity, only with 
that of psychoanalysis today. 11 21 
Along with commentaries on and translations and interpretations 
of Plato, Plotinus and later Neoplatonic writings came waves of es-
says, treatises, and 11 orations 11 on the 11 nature of man, 11 newly con-
ceived in nearly miraculous aspect. Early among these was the work of 
the Florentine writer, Manetti, particularly his On the Dignity and 
Excellence of Man, which appeared in 1452, a decade before the estab-
11 
lishment of the Platonic Academy in Florence. Manetti dazzled the new 
intelligensia and literati with the vision of man as "endowed .•. with 
the qualities that he and his contemporaries valued most--beauty, 
creativity and inventiveness, wisdom, wealth and power. 1•22 Manetti 's 
focus concentrated especially on the works of man: 
... all homes, all towns, all cities, finally all buildings of 
the world which certainly are so many and of such a nature 
that they ought rather to be regarded as the works of angels 
than of man •••• Ours are the painting, ours the sculptures, 
ours the arts, ours the sciences, ours •.. the wisdom, final-
ly ••• all discoveries, ours are all the different kinds of 
1 anguages and 1iteratures. 11 23 
The Neoplatonic rapture with human potency of reason, morality, 
creativity and self-transcendence flamed through the consciousness of 
the time and reached its apotheosis in 1486 in Pico della Mirandola's 
Oration on the Dignity of Man. In Mirandola's Oration, man was 
pictured as created by God with "seeds pregnant with~ possibili-
ties" (emphasis added)24 and fashioned to be "the free and proud 
shaper of (his) own being. 11 25 In Mirandola 1 s vision, man was con-
ceived to be not only the creator of himself and his world through the 
potency of his knowledge of himself and of all things in himself, but 
to be, as he actualized himself in utter fullness of creation, "filled 
with the Godhead ••• , no longer (himself), but the very One who made 
(him). 11 26 
The convictions of Ficino, Manetti, Mirandola and other Neo-
platonic thinkers and writers during this superlatively creative 
epoch reverberated in the lives and works of the artists--Botticelli, 
da Vinci, Fracastoro, Vasari, the 11 Divine 11 27 Michelangelo •.• --and 
promoted the outburst of splendor that was the Italian Renaissance. 
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The shift in the conception· of creativity here at the turn of 
western civilization from ancient and medieval times to modern was 
two-fold. First, and most importantly, the source of human creativity 
was retrieved from the external mystical site of the Muses and deities 
(with implicated problems of validation) and placed squarely within 
man himself as part of his own nature, his God-given endowment of 
ability. The wellspring of the effulgent creative outpouring of the 
Italian Renaissance was not an external God or touch of grace but the 
divine potency within the creative artists, architects, philosophers 
and writers themselves. The transporting effects of artistic expres-
siveness which caused Plato to exclude all but highly censored and 
controlled artistry from the well-ordered State, and which found 
little foothold in the contemplative Christian medieval period, were 
freed for a century in Italy and gifted the quatrocentro with unequal-
led creative achievements. During this unparalleled epoch, creativity 
was conceived as an internal capacity shared in varying degrees by 
all, but amounting to "genius 11 28 in a few overwhelmingly gifted indi-
viduals such as Michelangelo. 
The secondary shift in the conception of creativity concerns the 
absence of serious hesitation before the non-rational aspects of the 
creative experience or product. The concentration in the Platonic 
dialogues on questions of epistemology, ethics and political theory 
led to the rejection of the irrational elements of the creative pro-
cess and product. In contrast to the tumultuous Greek fifth and 
fourth century BC, the Renaissance and Quatrocento Italy enjoyed peace 
and burgeoning commerce in which ambiance the revival of the great 
13 
classics produced monumental pride and trust in human individuality 
and personal development. The Renaissance, like ancient Greece, 
breached the limits of reason and sense-based knowledge in its 
aesthetic excesses, as can be seen in the passage from Mirandola's 
Oration quoted on page (11) above, but imagination's flights had 
become a significant part of man's own divine self-transcendence 
through the Neoplatonism that rationalized the Renaissance. The 
extravagances and excesses of the artist were cognized and even 
categorized as 11 madness 11 29 during the Renaissance, but the creative 
expressions of the greats were accepted as the 11 heights 11 30 of human 
achievement and as inspirations to all. 
The Eighteenth Century Enlightenment 
Under profound artistic influences from the two preceding cen-
turies the arts were a central concern of most of the thought flooding 
Europe during the century (1700-1800) known as the Enlightenment. The 
prodigious outpourings of the Italian Renaissance (1400-1600) had 
quelled, but their influence was still burning deep in the European 
consciousness, as was the influence of the ancient classics which had 
inspired the Renaissance florescence. The period of Elizabethan Eng-
land (1533-1603) too had come to a close, but the products of its most 
spectacular progeny, Shakespeare and Milton, continued to hold 
cathectic power over continental and British philosophers, critics, 
and artists alike through the whole of the Enlightenment. The age of 
French Classicism,~ grand siecle of 1600-1700, had produced the 
peerless dramatists, Corneille, Moliere, and Racine, along with the 
great classic painter, Nicholas Poussin, and a stream of brilliant 
critical writings. 
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In addition to the rich inheritances from the arts, the Enlight-
enment in Europe began under the influence of two major philosophical 
developments which were to direct its conceptualizations concerning 
creativity, talent, genius and inspiration. In England an empirical, 
scientific philosophy of experimentation had taken root by the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century through the works of Sir Francis 
Bacon. By the last decades of that century, the scientific, observa-
tional flare had produced John Locke's empirical philosophy which 
centered on a new theory of mental processes, a psychology of asso-
ciationism. At the same time, Sir Isaac Newton had begun restructur-
ing conceptions of the physical universe and had delineated a potent 
two-stage scientific method beginning with observation, experiment and 
induction and from there proceeding to theorizing through resulting 
deduction.31 Under the Baconian influence, the intellectual orienta-
tion of the Enlightenment in England began with a singly scientific, 
observational, experimental bias. In contrast, the bias of Cartesian 
rationalism ernbued the French critical work of the seventeenth century 
classicism with a predilection for logical method, rule, deduction and 
basic principles, and this coloration swept across the entire French 
Enlightenment and dominated the critical thinking of the first half of 
the English Enlightenment, as well. 
Ultimately the strongest force in the eighteenth century theori-
zations concerning human creativity, however, came from a third 
quarter: revived Neoplatonism closely allied with Renaissance Neo-
15 
platonism through the philosophical dialogues and expository "letters" 
of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury. 
At the outset of the Enlightenment, the conceptions of creativi-
ty, the arts, genius and the imagination that held the most sway were 
those of the French Classicists, most importantly of Boileau (1636-
1711), "the law-giver of Parnasus. 11 32 Carrying Cartesian rationalism 
deep into the fields of the creative arts, Boileau and other French 
Enlightenment critics held "rational knowledge" to be at the apex of 
artistic experience and designated "reason, logic and mathematics" as 
the methods by which to achieve knowledge and beauty in the domain of 
the arts. By purely deductive argumentation, the rationalists secured 
the arts fast to knowledge through the establishment of "imitation" as 
the "universal principle" of the arts and through the deduction of 
"rules" which would guide the artist to perfect imitation, beauty, 
truth.33 
Previously, Plato's reason-oriented philosophy of the arts had 
foundered, in part, on precisely the recognition of the imitative as-
pects of the arts. Due to the idealistic underpinnings of Platonic 
philosophy, significant reality was denied to material objects. 
Reality was non-material in Plato's vision; it was only secondarily 
reflected in the material world and therefore imitative arts could 
only provide a reflection of a reflection of the truth. Since, for 
Plato, the highest good was in the achievement of knowledge of reali-
ty, the result was that the arts could not be saved from devaluation 
in human experience. The fact that the most affective products of 
artistic creation were often conceived inspirationally and were not 
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accessible to rational explanation removed them altogether from 
the status of the acceptable in human experience in Plato 1 s view. For 
the Cartesian relationalists, however, the search for knowledge 
through 11 reason 11 vrns not a search for metaphysical essences but for 
applicable universal principles; imitation was the universal principle 
of all arts and 11 rules 11 could be established through deductive reason 
for the achievement of perfect imitation. Many questions were begged 
here, of course, but the 11 rules 11 devised and the works achieved were 
generally so satisfying to the sentiments of the times that they 
seemed to vindicate the theories. 
Within the webwork of the theories, it must be noted, contradic-
tions did emerge, but they were overcome by the sleight of hand of 
hidden assumptions. First, the experience of complete breakthroughs 
and brilliant originalities challenged the notion of the highest ac-
complishments 1 being attainable through 1'rules leading to perfect 
imitation and beauty. 11 Although Boileau himself asserted that the 
rules were universal and there was no room for license, he finessed 
the implicit contradition in such poetic suggestions as the following: 
It is in vain that a rash author thinks to climb Parnassus by 
dint of his versifying art. If he does not feel the secret 
influence of heaven, if the star which presided at his birth 
did not make him a poet, then he will always remain the victim 
of his me~2re genius. For him Phoebus is deaf and Pegasus 
stubborn. 
11 Versifying art 11 involved, of course, the very rules which were needed 
to arrive at "correctness. 11 But something else was apparently needed: 
gift, talent, taste .•. ? This "something else" is only variously 
named, not systematically uncovered in Boileau's or other Classicists' 
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critical works. Clearly, this essential ingredient was acknowledged 
but was not reduced to a basic universal principle. Though the ques-
tion was approached one way and another by the writers following 
Boileau, the frustratingly vague but apt French phrase, "je ne sais 
quoi" ("I don't know what") served as the final descriptor for that 
gift, talent, taste, special genius, as well as for the ingredient in 
the work that makes it original, sublime, a breakthrough. And, it was 
the vague "star which presided at his birth," rather than rules or 
capacities, that was implicitly left with the responsibility for the 
highest of achievements and effects. As Wittkower points out in his 
essay, "Imitation, Eclecticism and Genius," the Renaissance "convic-
tion that artists are born not made" was paradoxically not even 
abandoned "by the most avid propagators of imitation and the rules, 11 35 
the French Classicists of the eighteenth century. 
Following Boileau, the critics Bouhours (1687) and Dubos (1719) 
began the first significant shifts in French Classicism away from the 
dominating current of pure rationalism in dealing with the processes 
and products of human creativity. In place of reason and deductive 
rules, they suggested the operation of a sensitivity, or "delica-
tesse," as the central guide in artistic creation and appreciation. 
Through this introduction of the experiential-emotional faculty, the 
qualities of "exactness and correctness" required by "reason and the 
rules" could be replaced by the psychologically more relevant quality 
of inexactness or indistinctness, which was conceived as inspiring the 
imagination of both the creator and the appreciator. Both of these 
nevi psychological factors, "delicatesse" and indistinctness, bore 
considerable aesthetic fruit.36 
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Of particular importance is the fact that, with the introduction 
of "delicatesse, 11 the concept of a non-rational element of feeling 
began to play an active and productive role, along with the rational 
intellect, in the understanding of artistic creation and aesthetic 
enjoyment. After Dubos' aesthetic theory had elevated the experience 
of "being moved" to the status of the motive force in all human 
activity, with the experience of pleasure as its natural goal, the 
element of emotion became a central feature in theories concerning 
artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation.37 
Creativity achieved its most important treatment in the En-
1 ightenment through the works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671-1713) in England.38 As can be seen from his essays, 
which were collected together in the early 1700's under the title 
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Shaftesbury accepted 
the logical part that learned technique and taste had to play in 
artistic creation and appreciation; however, he rejected both the 
radical rationalism of the Classicists and the empirical-psychological 
approach of his countrymen. Rather, he looked back to the Renaissance 
and the ancients for touchstones. Shaftesbury saw nature partially 
with the eyes of eighteenth century science, which was issuing forth 
ne\'I' visions of dynamic interactive forces in nature, and partially 
with the eyes of an artist, as he himself was the author of creative 
philosophical dialogues. Beginning with the recognition of his own 
spontaneous and immediate experience of both nature and art (that is, 
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experience without the mediation of reason), Shaftesbury developed an 
intuitional aesthetics which was rich in implications for philosophy 
in the Enlightenment39 and the Romantic Age that followed. 
The major breakthrough suggested by Shaftesbury's thought was 
the implication from his intuitional aesthetics that creativity was 
the sole technique for understanding the universe. This conception 
set rational knowledge aside as the crowning experience for man and 
substituted for it intuitional understanding. Where the rationalists 
had seen universal laws as basic to nature and had identified reason 
as the vehicle for gaining knowledge of those laws and hence of 
nature, and where empiricists and scientists were observing, experi-
menting, and logically inducing general conclusions from which laws of 
nature could be logically deduced, Shaftesbury saw ''nature itself in 
its deeper sense (as) not the sum total of created things but the 
t . n40 Th crea ive power.... ence, 
Only the artist who constantly brings forth from within 
himself worlds in miniature giving them definite shape will be 
able to understand the universe as the creation of the same 
forces of which he is aware in his own creative processes.41 
An important implication for the conceptions developing around notions 
of creativity was the assertion that 
the creation of the artist is no mere product of his subjec-
tive imagination, no empty phantasm; it is an expression of 
true being in the sense of an inner necessity and law.42 
This participation in the universal creative process is, for 
Shaftesbury, the quality and capacity of genius. With this definitive 
concept, Shaftesbury raised the idea of genius out of the previous 
vague associations with techniques, products and effects or special 
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faculties of reason, sensibility, etc. In addition, Shaftesbury also 
made a clear contribution to the question of inspiration: 
No poet ••. can do anything great in his own way without the 
imagination or supposition of a divine presence, which may 
raise him to some degree of (enthusiasm). Even the cold 
Lucretius makes use of inspiration, when he writes against it 
and is forced to raise an apparition ~f Nature, in a divine 
form, to animate and conduct hi~ ..•. 4 
In the last decades of the eighteenth century, Shaftesbury's 
intuitional aesthetics, and particularly his concept of genius, were 
carried into fruitful new discussions by the German Idealist, Immanuel 
Kant. In his late work, The Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant 
defined genius in a decidedly Shaftesburian vein: 
'Genius' is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the 
rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of 
the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: 
'Genius' is the innate mental aptitug~ ( 1 ingenium 1 ) 'through 
which' nature gives the rule to art. 
Here, the "inborn" status of genius and its specific identification 
with creative productivity are carefully articulated. In addition, 
the rationalistic "rules of art" are given secondary place to the 
rules that are naturally realized in the art work of the creative 
genius. 
Kant's work also provides a further clarification of the concept 
of inspiration in its development after the Renaissance. Through his 
exacting analysis of concepts and human experience, Kant identified 
the source of the genius's ideas and originalities as internal to the 
nature of genius itself. Kant described the genius's experience of 
originality in these words: 
.•• where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not 
himself know how the 'ideas' for it have entered his 
45 head ..•• 
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Where Shaftesbury before him had suggested the creative process to 
involve something of a participatory correspondence between the crea-
tivity of the artistic genius and the creativity of nature itself, 
Kant treated artistic genius as a more independent and specific 
natural endowment which has the power to realize its own final artis-
tic ends through means it has realized in the process of creation. 
Kant's contribution here was to shift the emphasis in inspiration from 
an implicit interactive harmony with truths of all of nature and the 
universe to the internal natural genius of the artist alone. Kant 
treated inspiration so explicitly as within the realm of human mental 
experience and as non-rational at the same time that he appeared to be 
on the threshold of a conception of the "unconscious," which theories 
began to be developed in the decades following his work. 
The intensity of Kant's idealistic treatment of genius, inspira-
tion, and artistic creativity allowed his work to drive home the 
implication of nearly all previous theories of creativity that alluded 
to inspiration as the source of creativity since ancient times--that 
the creativity of genius cannot be taught or trained. Kant went 
beyond discounting the rationalist's inconsistently but frequently-
proposed thesis that creative perfection ("fine art") was attainable 
by the perfected application of 11 rules 11 in such passages as: 
••. we cannot learn to write in a true poetic vein, no matter 
how complete all the precepts of the poetic art may be, or 
however excellent its models. (Because) ..• no Homer or Wieland 
can show how his ideas, so rich at once in fancy and in 
thought, enter and assemble themselves in his brain, for the 
good reason that he does not himself know, and so cannot teach 
others.46 
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In the process of carefully articulating his conception of 
genius, Kant amplified the implications of the non-rational aspects of 
artistic creativity by setting artistic genius apart from intel-
lectual scientific giftedness on the basis of genius's being non-
rational. For Kant, the scientific intellectual gift could serve 
human knowledge and promote progress due precisely to its rational and 
communicable nature and hence it 11 could boast a ground of considerable 
superiority over those who merit the honour of being called geniuses 
(great artists). 11 47 It should be pointed out here that Kant actually 
was comparing artistic creativity (such as Shakespeare's) and scienti-
fic giftedness (such as Sir Isaac Newton's) on unequal grounds; artis-
tic creativity was analyzed in its process of originating and creat-
ing, its 11 issuing forth the nev1, 11 while scientific giftedness was 
analyzed at a later stage in its originating process, that of formu-
1 ating and explicating the new insight(s) or cognition(s). 
In contrast to the Renaissance, which attributed supreme value 
to creativity as a uniquely human process of aesthetic production and 
spiritual self-transcendence, the eighteenth century Enlightenment 
introduced the more experientially-based concepts of self-fulfilling 
pleasure and intuitive understanding of the universe's processes as 
the purpose and goal of human creativity. The Renaissance concept of 
genius as a 11 God-like 11 gift of creativity with which one is endowed at 
birth, if ever, was refined through the Enlightenment and was ulti-
mately identified specifically with the process of artistic creation. 
The process of creation was generally unexplored by Renaissance 
thinkers, being conceived as a natural outpouring from the internal 
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inspiration of the artist naturally endowed with the gift of creative 
expression. With the Enlightenment, theories of the creative process 
began to achieve some observational content as well as psychological 
depth. While inspiration continued, for the most part, to be 
conceived as essentially internal in origin and inexplicable, 
Enlightenment thinkers began to examine the artists' active participa-
tion in promoting excitement of the imagination and eliciting inspira-
tion from within. Finally, the Enlightenment began to give systematic 
treatment to the role of technique and skill in the creative process, 
articulating the place of the learning and practice of rules and 
methods as well as of taste. "Genius" remained beyond the reach of 
instruction and teaching in eighteenth century thought, while the 
highly rational and teachable sciences, which were burgeoning in their 
midst, \vere ultimately elevated even beyond products of "genius," to 
become the new epitome of human achievement, products of pure intel-
1ectua1 giftedness. 
In sum, the eighteenth century Enlightenment succeeded in net-
ting some of the past's more powerful but indefinite concepts relating 
to human creativity and in bringing them into more systematic treat-
ment and into closer contact with human experience. The observation-
al, analytical, and psychological approaches of modern theories of 
creativity began to dawn there, and the modern "problems" in the field 
began to take initial form. 
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The Birth of the Modern Era: 1900-1950 
In the first half of the twentieth century, theories concerning 
human creativity began to crystalize around several core issues dis-
tilled from the past centuries; genius, imagination, inspiration, and 
the creative process were central topics of early research and 
analytical studies. The new psychological method of psychoanalysis 
and the underlying theory of the unconscious had been formalized by 
Sigmund Freud just prior to the turn of the twentieth century, and 
that work gave new dimensions to studies of creativity. Along with 
having direct impact on notions of inspiration and processes of 
creation, Freudian psychology and other psychological theories gave 
rise to systematic studies of personality, which became a focal point 
in ensuing creativity research. In addition, educational interests 
fomented around concepts of intelligence and creativity early in the 
century, and the developing data-based research methods were applied 
to the new field of educational testing which gained many adherents in 
the ranks of educators and psychologists interested in creativity. 
The concept of genius, which had intrigued thinkers through the 
centuries, achieved its first modern treatment and defense in the 1865 
landmark study, Hereditary Genius, by Sir Francis Galton. Appearing 
as it did in the wake of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species, 1859, 
Galton's focus on the hereditary factor in genius was not altogether 
unprecedented; however, Galton's Introductions to the 1869 and 1892 
editions of his work suggest that it was not universally well-
received. Some of the points made by Galton in his Introduction to 
the first edition may indicate why the public reception was not 
entirely favorable. For example, he proposed: 
to show in this book that a man's natural abilities are 
derived by inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as 
are the form and physical features of the whole organic 
world. Consequently, as it is easy ... to obtain by careful 
selections a permanent breed of dogs or horses gifted with 
peculiar powers of running, or of doing anything else, so it 
would be quite practicable to produce a highly-gifted race of 
men by judicious marriages during several generations.48 
Nevertheless, the study had its impact and was followed in later 
decades by similar studies; the notion of hereditary influence on 
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intelligence and creativity has currency in some studies even in the 
closing decades of the twentieth century. 
Galton's study focused centrally on 415 illustrious men and 
their familial relationships to other eminent individuals through a 
study of public evidence of reputation and achievement as well as of 
biograhical records. Although his study was, at base, anecdotal, Gal-
ton accomplished a prodigious feat of documentation and statistical 
analysis of the historical data, developing the method which has come 
to be known as "historiometry."49 The result was a work which demon-
strated significant correlations between the eminent figures central 
to his study and a familiar background of eminently gifted indi-
viduals. Through his study, Galton contributed the first documenta-
tion of genius as not only possibly a hereditary trait, but as closely 
associated with creativity along a wide spectrum of human endeavors. 
Specifically, Galton linked genius with originality, creativity, and 
productivity, and assumed that the exceptional giftedness of genius 
26 
results almost unfailingly in reputations of eminence and culturally 
recognized achievements.SO Galton's study also provided an array of 
references to specific characteristics, tastes, talents and experi-
ences of the geniuses he researched in depth, thus providing the pre-
cursor to modern studies of talent, creativity, and giftedness based 
on character or personality traits and on environmental influences. 
The study of genius took a decisive turn away from the broad and 
subjective connotations it had carried, from the Renaissance up 
through Galton's work, primarily as a result of the development of 
intelligence instruments in the early 1900s. By 1920, the standard 
form of the IQ test had been established.51 With the apparent means 
of testing and measuring intellectual capacity, "genius" became iden-
tified with "high IQ" and studies began to center on the specific 
ability to achieve high scores on IQ tests, most commonly the 
Stanford-Binet test. 
Follm-Jing Galton, in 1921 Le~-Jis Terman began a 25-year longi-
tudinal research study of genius focusing on 1000 second to twelfth 
grade school children who tested in the upper 1% of the general school 
population in California on the Stanford-Binet. Terman's study was 
very broad-based, as it researched multiple aspects of influences on 
and performances of these young geniuses, from prenatal conditions, 
through early health, sociability, family, and education, to life-
style and achievement in adulthood. Carrying out this research across 
such a broad spectrum and over such an extended period of time allowed 
for the inclusion of many of the aspects of the subjects' lives and 
leanings not directly associated with or limited to IQ. For example, 
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personality profiles of youths were gathered through testing and 
gleaned from teacher and parent reports, performance and achievement 
across all curricular areas were tracked, and family background and 
environment were studied in depth. 
Ultimately, Terman's work served to strengthen the growing 
tendency in education to focus sharply on intelligence as measured by 
the IQ test and to identify "genius" with exceptionally high IQ 
scores. In addition, Terman's research bore out the long-standing 
conclusion "that superior achievement tends to run in families. 11 52 
The breadth and balance of his study, however, brought important col-
lateral aspects of genius and eminent achievement into modern focus. 
First, such traits as extreme curiosity, independence of judgement, 
unusual interests, and versatility,53 as well as a tendency to great 
enthusiasm,54 were identified as typical of the highly intelligent. 
The concentrated attention on "traits of genius," including psycho-
logical and behavioral traits, and on environmental influences on 
genius, was particularly exemplified in the second volume of Terman's 
study, The Early Mental Traits of Three Hundred Geniuses: Volume II 
of Genetic Studies of Genius, by Catherine M. Cox, 1926. 
Terman's research contributed not only to the modern definition 
and description of genius, but also brought to light several issues of 
importance to modern education. First, teachers' tendencies un-
wittingly to misjudge or to discount the highly gifted on the basis of 
unusual behaviors and traits55 were noted and explored. Second, coun-
tering the common myth of genius as often physically sickly and 
psychologically unstable,56 Terman's work provided a profile of gifted 
individuals "slightly superior"57 to the norm physically and less 
likely, over all, to experience significant mental or emotional 
crises.58 
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Further, in Terman's work, creativity was continuously implicit-
ly associated with genius. Initially, the study reported typically 
"very high" scores in the areas of art and literature as well as in 
science for the young geniuses in addition to a family background of 
eminent individuals of whom one third received their distinction for 
original, creative work. The follow-up study of the subjects noted 
that, by "mid-life," this group had authored 2000 scientific and 
technical papers and articles, 60 books and monographs in science as 
well in the liberal arts, 33 novels and 375 short stories and plays, 
60 essays and 265 articles on miscellaneous subject. In addition, 230 
patents had been granted to subjects in this study and thousands of 
radio and TV scripts had been produced by them.59 The achievements of 
the subjects proved to be highly creative as well as professionally 
significant. 
The questions and curiosity concerning the causes of genius, 
particularly hereditary and environmental causes, continued after Ter-
man's fruitful study, giving rise to a continuous flow of research in 
these areas. The central focus of identification for research on 
"genius" remained, in general, the specifically quantifiable IQ 
measurement of intellectual giftedness, amounting to a tautological 
definition of genius which still prevails at the close of the twen-
tieth century. As forthcoming research on creativity was to make 
clear, this dominance of emphasis on reason- and logic-centered intel-
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ligence caused a tacit disregard of creativity in the field of educa-
ti on. 
Just prior to the conclusion of Terman's study, a major review 
of research on questions of genius was published in 1940--Genius in 
the Making, by Herbert A. Carroll. In this work, Carroll underscored 
the conclusion of Galton and Terman, still theoretical albeit 
statistically demonstrated, "that genius runs in families. 11 60 
Following Terman and the publication of most of his research, Carroll 
was able to synopsize from that momentous study and other smaller 
studies to develop the beginnings of a taxonomy for the field of study 
of giftedness or genius. Of special importance in Carroll's review is 
his focus of serious and equal attention on artistic giftedness in the 
context of studies of genius and IQ.61 Carroll also brings attention 
to the work running parallel to research on genius and IQ concerning 
creativity and its measurement, reiterating the lack of correlation 
between creativity and IQ and noting the continued paucity of objec-
tive or validated tests for creativity,62 although some preliminary 
tests were being researched. 
Carroll's work, in the end, appeared to be a strong defense for 
both the intellectually and the creatively gifted. Although not ad-
vancing questions of the actual relationship between intelligence and 
creative or artistic giftedness, Carroll emphasized an underlying 
point of considerable significance concerning the environmental encum-
brances to the exceptionally gifted in America: 
There has developed in America, side by side with an enthu-
siasm for success stories, a cult of mediocrity. This is 
everywhere apparent in American social and political structure 
and, unfortunately, in the educational system.63 
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By the late 1940s, "genius" had become synonymous with excep-
tional levels of abstract intelligence as measured by IQ tests and, 
due to the recognized lack of correlation between intelligence test 
scores and known or assumed creative capacity, the concept of "genius" 
had formally lost its association with creativity. This lack of 
correlation had been noted as early as 1898 by Dearborn in his study 
of the responses of Harvard students to inkblots in a test of 
imaginative powers. He found that "some of the poorest records were 
made by students of the decidedly intellectual type. 11 64 In 1916, 
Laura Chassell reported replication of Dearborn's results, finding 
that, using her newly developed "originality tests," subjects' 
"performance on the IQ tasks bore relatively little relation to 
performance on the creativity tasks."65 By 1922, R.M. Simpson could 
sum up the failure of the dominant psychological IQ tests to account 
for creativity in human intellection in these words: 
Tests devised to ascertain either native intelligence or 
acquired knowledge are certainly valuable •... (However), there 
are no elements in them to extract from the mind of the indi-
vidual his powers of cr5ative productivity and his tendencies 
toward originality •••• 6 
The discontinuity between intellectual capacity as measured by IQ 
tests and creative capacity continued through the first half of the 
twentieth century. As Getzels and Jackson summarized the situation: 
(By 1946) the casual observation by Dearborn in 
come a commonplace research finding--giftedness 
ligence and giftedness in creativity were by no 
synonymous.67 
1898 had be-
i n intel-
means 
31 
While creativity had lost its explicit connection with the 
highly sought status of 11 genius 11 in the first half of the twentieth 
century, interest in filling the testing gap had produced some 
preliminary originality tests.68 At the same time, serious study was 
focusing on the unique processes and personalities which produce 
creative works. 
The process of creativity had come under increasingly close 
scrutiny following Henri Poincare's presentation of his own creative 
process in The Foundations of Science in 191S. Poincare recognized 
four basic stages or phases in his process, beginning with conscious 
work on a hard problem, after which rest was taken. When work was 
resumed, a period of fruitless endeavor would generally ensue and then 
"all of a sudden the decisive idea presents itself to the mind. 11 69 
Finally, after the 11 inspiration, 11 conscious work was resumed for 
formulation and 11 verification. 11 70 In 1926, G. Wallas' work, The Art 
of Thought, presented a four-stage breakdown of the creative pro-
cess very similar to Poincare's: (1) preparation, (2) incubation, (3) 
illumination, and (4) verification.71 
These stages in the proposed process of creativity became the 
focus of a research study in 1937 by Catherine Patrick in which she 
assembled SO professional and SO non-professional artists and observed 
their processes of sketching pictures. While they sketched, the sub-
jects were encouraged to express their thoughts aloud and to answer 
questions that were asked. Patrick's study confirmed a generally 
four-stage creative process similar to that outlined by Wallas to take 
place in the sketching of pictures, most decisively with the profes-
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sional artists, but the stages were not followed quite so sequentially 
as Wal 1 as suggested. 72 
The study of creativity in its dynamic process through the first 
half of the twentieth century provided increased understanding of some 
of the previously more mysterious aspects of creativity. Seen from 
the perspective of a somewhat sequential process where beginnings tend 
to be shrouded in vagueness and imprecision and where development 
leaps ahead once insight breaks through, the creative process appeared 
somewhat more rational, especially as the same process seemed to apply 
to both artistic and scientific enterprises. 
Increasingly during this period, processes of artistic and 
scientific creation were being sensed or seen to be similar. Not only 
did Poincare, a mathematician, outline a creative process naturally 
followed also by artists, but in his work, Art and Experience, 1934, 
the philosopher and educator, John Dewey, analyzed in detail the pro-
cess of creativity in thought which occurs irrespective of its field 
of application. In brief, according to Dewey, creative insight takes 
place when, through interest in a problem and a natural process of 
incubation, conscious intuition, like "a flash of revelation, 11 73 
brings the unknown and known into sudden harmony of recognition. 
Dewey described this intuition as "neither an act of pure intellect in 
apprehending truth (i.e. logically or scientifically) nor a ••• grasp by 
spirit of its own images and states (i.e. artistically), 11 74 but rather 
as a natural mental process of connecting the old (known) with the new 
(unknown), which is operative in any field of conscious interest. 
Here, inspiration or illumination received a very rational and dynamic 
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description, and the still inexplicable mechanism of the flash of 
creative insight was recognized as being of something of the same 
nature for both scientific and artistic creation. The difference Kant 
had assumed to exist between the two processes (at different stages) 
was here, at the stage of creative inception or insight, resolved, 
but differences between the two creative processes on other levels 
remained to be worked out. 
The framework of the stages of the creative process, together 
with the psychological and biographical data generated in the research 
on genius, provided a vantage point from which investigators could 
focus more closely than ever on the creative individual at work and in 
his or her development. The creative personality became, in the early 
twentieth century, a new subject for investigation by researchers. 
Such investigation could draw to itself theories and starting points 
from the emerging fields of psychology and psychoanalysis as well as 
draw together the tangential or fragmenta~ information brought out in 
studies of genius and in the literature on and by creative individuals 
through the centuries. 
The psychology of the creative personality began to take con-
crete form as early as 1928 with Alpert's article, 11 The Solving of 
Problem Situations by Pre-School Children," in which he reported: 
The arousal of insight and its consummation in a practical 
solution are favored by emotional, temperamental, and mental 
factors--those which in effect constitute the total personal-
ity. 75 
The classic work, The Road to Xanadu, by J. L. Lowes, in which Cole-
ridge's personality and creative process are described in some detail, 
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appeared in 1930,76 and The Psychology of the Inventor, by J. Rossman, 
followed in 1931,77 detailing inventors' processes and personality 
traits on the basis of answers to questionnaires designed for the 
study. The psychologist, Anne Roe, began her concentration on crea-
tive personalities with research into the personalities of artists, 
published in 1946, and then into scientific creative personalities, 
published in 1949 and early 1950. In her research investigation of 
the distinguishing characteristics of eminent artists and scientists, 
Roe's main conceptions centered on the intensely driven nature of the 
whole creative personality, the whole person, in the creative pro-
cess.78 Although her work was closely bound to objective research 
procedures, an anecdotal and biographical quality characterizes Roe's 
psychology of the creative personality as it did most of the early 
work in this new area of psychological investigation. 
In 1949, the creative personality became one of the focal points 
of research at the newly established Institute of Personality Assess-
ment and Research (!PAR). IPAR was designed to follow objective and 
well-structured assessment procedures to research the personal lives 
and careers of highly effective people and to investigate the question 
of how such people are produced in our society.79 Its derivation from 
the research of the first half-century is obvious, and its specific 
inclusion of creativity and creative people is understandable. 
As the research on creativity at IPAR was broken into four parts 
(the creative product, the creative process, the creative person, and 
the creative situation), the psychology of the creative person re-
ceived only a portion of the initial efforts of the Institute in 
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researching creativity; however, with the use of such comprehensive 
instruments as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), 
'~hich became available in 1943, and other objective tests and pro-
cedures at the Institute, a major effort was inaugurated to research 
the psychology of the creative person in depth. 
Although, according to Getzels and Csikskentmihalyi, between the 
years 1900 and 1950 "creativity had only a small constituency and no 
market, 11 80 the present review does suggest that the study of creativi-
ty was gaining ground on several fronts during this period. While 
creativity was technically dislodged from its traditional position at 
the center of the emotionally-toned concept of "genius, 11 it was kept 
very much in view by two aspects of the new historiometric and psycho-
1 ogical research into 11 genius 11 --l) a significant portion of the sub-
jects researched were illustriously creative, and 2) psychologists us-
ing the new intelligence tests became quickly sensitive to the pos-
sibility of a significant limitation of the instruments since they ap-
peared to be 11 creativity-blind 11 and therefore substantially limited. 
Further, research into genius had amassed large collections of 
incidental psychological data concerning creative individuals, which 
ultimately helped to fuel the new thrust of psychological investiga-
tions into the creative personality. Finally, the question of the 
creative process itself, which had been tacitly central to the con-
cerns about creativity since ancient times began to be systematically 
explored early in the twentieth century. By mid-century, many of the 
basic features of creating had been generally outlined and demysti-
fied, and relationships between scientific and artistic creativity 
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began to emerge, promising much for future concepts of intelligence 
and human creativity alike. The first half of the twentieth century 
was not explosive with breakthroughs in "creativity theory, 11 but the 
progress in theory and application was steady and substantial. This 
period delivered many traditional concepts about creativity in revised 
and clearer terms to the second half of the century, and it delivered 
new methods, perspectives, instruments and subjects to enrich the 
research and other investigations into creativity for the ensuing 
decades. 
CHAPTER I I I 
CREATIVITY AND EDUCATION: 1950-1985 
The researchers in the field of creativity received a powerful 
spur to action in 1950 by J.P. Guilford 1 s landmark Presidential Ad-
dress to the American Psychological Association: 
The neglect of this subject by psychologists is appalling. 
The evidences of the neglect are so obvious that I need not 
give proof. But the extent of the neglect I had not realized 
until recently •••• Of the approximately 121,000 titles listed 
(In 11 Psychological Abstracts 11 ) in the past 23 years, only 186 
were indexed as definitely bearing on the subject of creativi-
ty •••• In other words, less than two-tenths of one percent of 
the books and articles indexed in the abstracts for approxi-
mately the past quarter century bear directly on the 
subject.Bl 
The areas of creativity that had assumed central importance in 
the research during the first half of the twentieth century began 
increasingly to appear as the focal points of major research efforts 
in articles in professional and education journals after 1950. The 
investigations since 1950 have focused most vigorously on the creative 
personality or "disposition 11 82 and creativity tests, with significant 
work also centering on the creative process and the role of schools in 
fostering creativity. As Thurstone predicted in 1952, "In starting 
formal studies of inventive talent we may have to explore widely 
before finding the clews (sic) that may eventually enable us to iden-
tify such talent at an early age. 11 83 
38 
The Creative Personality 
Personality research, following the extensive explorations by 
Anne Roe and L.M. Terman in the first half of the twentieth century 
and the establishment of the Institute of Personality Assessment and 
Research (IPAR) in 1949, began with strong presentations of findings 
accumulated by such researchers as Anne Roe, Frank Barron and Donald 
W. MacKinnon. Both eminent artists and scientists were observed, 
tested, interviewed and assessed by these investigators with resulting 
identification of significant personality and behavioral tendencies in 
common among them. These initial objective and in-depth visions of 
creative personalities and their processes provided a rich background 
against which to view the creativity-related theories of psychologists 
such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow as well as the observations 
being collected in the school setting of creative children and chil-
dren's creativity. 
Of particular importance in the early stages of creative per-
sonality research was the identification of the somewhat anomalous 
behaviors and psychological sets quite common to the notable creative 
individuals under study. These included such characteristics as 
introversion, self-assertiveness and dominance with attendant self-
assuredness, unusual divergent thinking patterns, independence of 
judgement, complexity of personality, humor and playfulness, non-
conformity and imperviousness to social pressure, and dedication or 
drivenness of personality.84 The personality characteristics of crea-
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tive individuals relate to important issues concerning the creative 
person, education, and society at large. 
First, as educators and psychologists have pointed out85, these 
personality characteristics and the others documented as falling along 
side them in the personality profiles typical of creative people are 
logically necessary components of a personality which can break with 
established traditions and views to see and give expression to the 
entirely "novel." The creative conceptualization must follow unusual 
by-ways with concentrated attention and involvement sufficient to 
resist the pressures and the temptation to "stick, after all, with the 
accepted and the acceptable view." As Carl Rogers suggested: 
••• the more original the product, and the more far-reaching 
its implications, the more likely it is to be judged by con-
temporaries as evil. The genuinely significant creation, 
whether an idea, or a work of art, or a scientific discovery, 
is most likely to be seen at first as erroneous, bad or fool-
ish.86 
The tendency in the research to identify and isolate the 
anomalous characteristics of creative personalities has laid the 
groundwork for a possible atomization of the complex psychology in-
valved, especially when "identification" became a dominant issue, but 
the major trend in the field of psychology dealing with creativity has 
::,een to emphasize the interconnectedness of these traits and "the 
total personality of the originator 11 87 underlying these related 
traits. The creative individual must follow his or her own star, 
unusually alone and often in the face of severe judgement, even 
ostracism, in order to produce the authentically new breakthrough. 
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Second, peer-pressure is a central force in the daily life of 
the student from intermediate grades through college, as nearly all 
graduates of educational institutions in the United States know from 
personal experience. The effects of this condition have generally 
been rather readily accepted as "good socialization-training" by edu-
cators, parents and social-psychologists by and large, until recent-
ly. The negative effects that the school-years' group pressure might 
have produced have not been a very widely-recognized phenomenon, and 
most adult efforts to ameliorate stress-producing peer-rejection 
situations have involved either attempting to bring the group under 
central teacher-control or trying to "help" the rejected student ad-
just himself or herself to the peer-expectations, or both. As Tor-
ranee pointed out, "Unusual or original ideas are common targets for 
peer pressure to conform, 11 88 and " •.. children are taught early the 
harsh consequences of divergent behavior, even outstanding performance 
in many areas of life. 11 89 The "socialization-training" may be heavily 
counterproductive, it appears. According to Crutchfield, the training 
may be in self-abdication: 
Conformity, involving loss of self-reliance, undermines the 
person's creative powers by weakening his trust in the es-
sential validity of his own processes of thought and imagina-
tion .•.• (It) inhibits the person's ability to sense and grasp 
basic reality, and the loss of this contact with reality is 
fatal to creative thinking. In short, conformity tends to 
destroy creativity •••• 90 
As a consequence, school is often neither an academically "totally 
successful" nor personally "terribly satisfying" experience for the 
highly creative person, as the research on eminently creative 
individuals suggests.91 
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Third, as suggested by Ziegfield in 1961, " strong trends 
toward conformity and uniformity are increasing in our culture."92 
Those trends have continued to increase. The conclusion of Toynbee in 
1962, however, states a significant implication of Ziegfield's ob-
servation: "To give a fair chance to potential creativity is a matter 
of life and death for any society.,, 93 
This early direction in the mid-twentieth century psychology of 
creativity, focusing on the multiple, often uncommon, facets of the 
creative personality and behavior, provided a solid foundation for 
further, frank assessments of the creative adult which could be, to a 
degree, extended to the student in school. The field v1as already in 
full stride of development when Sputnik was launched in 1957, 
galvanizing all of America to the needs for more creativity in the 
nation, particularly in the sciences. Creativity began to be given 
new importance in education.94 
While initial tests of "creativity" were still in preliminary 
and uncertain form,95 research psychologists proceeded with studies to 
identify and assess the personality and behavioral correlates of 
recognized creative adults. In the educational setting, parallel ob-
servational investigations were brought to focus on school children. 
Finding behavior and personality patterns among potentially creative 
students similar to those of ultimately creative adults, educational 
psychologists were able to give initial outlines to some of the pos-
sibilities, needs and problems facing schools with respect to creative 
children. The tentative "profile of creative students" began to 
achieve form and "reputation," as it were. The spontaneity, noncon-
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formity, independence, impulsiveness and humor of potentially creative 
students were leading educators to the perception that creative stu-
dents could be viewed by teachers and peers as "obnoxious, 11 96 and 
"difficult to get along with, 11 97 and were "often not easy to toler-
ate. "98 Observations were, therefore, not surprisingly, suggesting 
that "creative behaviors" were being suppressed in the classroom set-
ting.99 
At the same time, the professional and public interest in crea-
tivity and its cultivation for the nation's welfare were mounting: 
1954-- Not only individual maladjustment and group tensions 
but international annihilation will be the price we pay 
for a lack of creativity.100 
1959-- The most urgent reason (for the interest in increased 
creative performance and the nature of creativity) is 
that we are in a mortal struggle for the survival of 
our way of life in the world.101 
Razik summarized the American awakening in the late 1950's: 
However creative our scientists and engineers had been pre-
vious to Sputnik, they would need to be more creative in the 
future; their numbers would have to be greatly increased •••• 
Research on creativity became legitimized as a properln seri-
ous concern of the military, government and industry.I 2 
The studies centering on creative individuals were exciting "a 
good deal of interest and curiosity"103 by the 1960's. The following 
two decades sa\'I the proliferation of "creative personal ity 11 research 
and assessment by psychologists, and the application of their findings 
by educators to the understanding of creative students. As the di-
verse personality characteristics correlated with creative adults 
began to be absorbed by researchers and theoreticians and applied in 
educational research in the schools, the understanding of the creative 
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personality deepened. The highly noticeable and important trait of 
"nonconformity," which could be difficult to distinguish from a merely 
conflictive reactionary tendency, for example, was analyzed carefully 
by Pepinsky;l04 and two forms of nonconformity were distinguished: 
the productive and the non-productive. The utility of this analysis 
can be seen, especially when coupled with Pepinsky's suggested stra-
tegies for turning authentic but non-productive independent-mindedness 
into "productive" nonconformity for the good of all. Its utility in 
the school setting can be easily assumed in light of the article by 
Torrance which appeared the year before and which emphasized a crucial 
implication for schools of the growing understanding of creative 
ch i1 dren' s temperament and persona 1 i ty: "The schoo 1 's job is one of 
helping the highly creative child to learn to be less obnoxious with-
out sacrificing his creativity.••105 Another example of the creative 
personality's being more deeply fathomed is seen in the work of Robert 
C. Wilson. In an article in Education, 1960, Wilson drew from the 
extensive research on eminent scientists to neutralize the long-
standing social and educational contention that to be highly success-
ful an individual needs to be "well-rounded." He notes, " •.. to be a 
highly productive or creative adult, one cannot be well-rounded. One 
must devote a very great amount of time to one area of interest. 11 106 
In the end, "interest" must be acknowledged as the basis of "en-
counter" from which all genuine creativity flows, according to May.107 
Another myth-dispelling point concerning high-level creativity 
brought out by the personality research since 1950 was the fact that 
evidence of potentially great creativity in a field of work is often 
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not apparent in the creative individual's early years. As Hudson 
noted, " ... nothing of Darwin's previous development could possibly 
alert us (to his outstanding talent). It simply is not the case that 
psychologists, even with the benefit of hindsight, can detect the 
signs of his dormant gifts. 11 108 Similarly, Roe determined from her 
study of 64 eminent scientists that such creative persons do not 
necessarily decide on careers in science "just as a matter of always 
following a natural talent. (But rather, in fact,) the most important 
factor in the final decision to become a scientist is the discovery 
(often late in college years) of the joys of research.,, 109 
As a further example of the extensive penetration of the work in 
the psychology of creativity, Torrance followed leads from the recent 
psychological studies and his own education-based research and con-
cluded that the development of creative capacity was important not 
simply for society's or the nation's "survival"llO but for the healthy 
development of the individual's personality: "I believe there is 
little question that prolonged, enforced repression of the creative 
desire may lead to actual breakdown of the personality. 11 111 Another 
dimension was added to this insight by Toynbee: '\.Jhen creative 
ability is thwarted, it will not be extinguished; it is more likely to 
be given an antisocial turn. 11 112 
Assessment of Creativity 
At the beginning of modern creative personality research, a 
number of psychological testing instruments were available for objec-
tive assessment and data collection,113 such as preliminary versions 
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of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), Gough's 
"Adjective Check List, 11 Strong's "Vocational Interest Test, 11 the Cali-
fornia Psychological Inventory, and the classical Rorschach Psycho-
diagnostic and Thematic Apperception tests.114 In contrast, a few as-
sessrnent instruments for "creativity" as a special capacity or apti-
tude were in preliminary form, but were not yet certain or vali-
dated.115 In his Presidential Address to the APA in 1950, Guilford 
summed up, at once, the paucity of instruments to measure or identify 
creative ability and the long-hypothesized difference between strictly 
intellectual abilities as measured by standard intelligence tests and 
the creative capacities. 
Tests designed to measure intelligence have fallen into cer-
tain stereotyped patterns, under the demands for objectivity 
and for scoring convenience. I do not now see how some of the 
creative abilities, at least, can be measured by means of any-
thing but completion tests of some kind. To provide the 
creator with the finished product, as in a multiple-choice 
item, may prevent him from shm'ling precisely what we want him 
to show; his own creation •••• What I am saying is that the 
quest for easily objectifiable testing and scoring has 
directed us away from the attempt to measure some of the most 
precious qualities of individuals and hence to ignore those 
qual ities.116 
In other words, we must look well beyond the bound9ries of the 
IQ if we are to fathom the domain of creativity.11 
First suggested as early as 1922 by R.M. Simpson,118 the pos-
sible creativity-blindness of standardized intelligence tests and the 
hypothesized independence of creative and intelligence (IQ) factors 
encouraged the development of distinct creativity-assessment tests. 
Included in Guilford's 1950 Address to the APA were suggestions for 
test-tasks to measure nine factors which Guilford initially hypo-
thesized as important in creativity: sensitivity to problems; 
fluency; novel ideas; flexibility; and the abilities to synthesis, 
analyze, reorganize or redefine, to handle complexity, and to 
eval uate.119 
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Guilford's factors and his suggested test-tasks figured impor-
tantly in the development of the first creativity test batteries by 
Torrance and his colleagues at Minnesota (1961). Where 11 immersion 11 in 
written information about recognized creative persons provided Tor-
rance and his associates with reality-relevance guidelines, Guilford's 
work provided material which could be directly adapted for use in the 
initial Forms A and B of the Minnesota Tests for Creative Thinking.120 
Form C (Test of Imagination) was then added, involving a "modify the 
toy to be more fun" task for younger children. 
By 1962, Torrance and his colleagues were aware of a need for a 
broader scope of test tasks and a wider range of behavioral observa-
tions to gain a more complete view of elementary school children's 
creativity. Their battery was revised accordingly to include a 
greater variety of stimuli and a larger number of the senses and to 
allow for wider ranges of behavioral observations in the seven verbal 
and three figural tests.121 In their revised forms, the Torrance 
Tests of Creative Thinking were designed to measure a broad spectrum 
of creativity-related factors, including divergent-thinking factors, 
elaboration and originality, curiosity, sensitivity to problems, 
complexity and communication.121 
Torrance's contribution to filling the gap in creativity assess-
ments has been considerable, if not without limitations. Gowan and 
Demos describe Torrance as "the prime developer of creativity assess-
ment in school children, and the foremost champion of measures to 
increase creativity in the classroom. 11 123 
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Though the Torrance Creative Thinking Tests remain the most 
comprehensive creativity test battery and the most widely used in 
schools, other aptitude-centered creativity tests have been developed 
and used in the educational setting. Most important among these is 
the \~a 11 ach and Kogan Battery (W-K) which is based on Mednick 1 s con-
ception of the creative process as the association of ideas initially 
quite remote from one another.124 The Wallach and Kogan Battery is 
nearly as \vi dely used in schools as the Torrance Battery, and its con-
tents parallel the Torrance Battery somewhat closely both in involving 
verbal and visual components and in including similar subtests, such 
as Alternate Uses (W-K)/Unusual Uses (Torrance) and Visual Content 
Tasks (W-K)/Incomplete Figures (Torrance). 
The use of the Torrance and the Wallach and Kogan batteries has 
been wide enough that considerable data have been collected regarding 
their possible validity and/or predictive power. Although the authors 
of each of the batteries have themselves concluded that validity and 
predictive power can be asserted for their tests, uncertainties still 
abound. In 1972, Crockenberg asserted that the validity evidence for 
both was "cl early i nconcl usi ve, 11 125 and there are multiple questions 
challenging these tests. 
As with all tests addressing "creative capacity, 11 the Torrance 
Creative Thinking Tests and the Wallach and Kogan Battery aim at 
measuring key aspects, if not the whole, of 11 creativity 11 as identified 
by the conceptualizations of the authors. For the Torrance Tests, the 
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central feature of creativity was envisioned to be divergent (unusual) 
thinking in forming ideas or hypotheses to solve sensed or stated pro-
blems.126 Although expressed quite differently, the basic concept of 
"creativity" behind the Wallach and Kogan Battery is generally 
similar; the Wallach and Kogan thesis centers, as stated above, on the 
association of ideas remote from one another in the normal thinking 
pattern where the association is not only unusual but also appropriate 
for solving the problem.127 In general, then, both the unusualness of 
ideas, as measured by the rarity with which those answers are given, 
and the appropriateness of ideas to the task's solution, as judged by 
individual assessment, serve as the basic measurements of these two 
batteries. 
\~hile it may be that divergent thinking or associational 
thinking are the essential characteristics of processes of creative 
functioning, it is still necessary to determine if the several factors 
that are isolated and measured by the tests are the discrete elements 
which may account for or predict real-life creativity. Since these 
instruments have been used primarily with school children, the ques-
tion of the validity of the measurements for real-life creativity has 
been somewhat distant from demonstration and this constitutes one of 
the major obstacles to their being accepted as clear indices of 
creativity. Secondly, the distinctness of the factors measured from 
any aptitude other than "creativity" has been difficult to demonstrate 
conclusively. Since there has been fairly wide acceptance of the 
long-standing hypothesis that standard intelligence tests and achieve-
ment tests, which are used to the saturation point in education, do 
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not measure aspects of creative potentia1,128 hov1ever, the utility of 
separate creativity measures has been long assumed; the question in 
the aptitude-testing atmosphere is only whether the currently 
available creativity measurements do, in fact, measure creativity 
factors, as such. 
In attempting to address the question of predictive validity, 
Torrance undertook a 12-year longitudinal study using his Creative 
Thinking Test which, according to the author, resulted in indications 
"that the performance of high school students (on the tests) is re-
1 ated significantly to their adult creative achievement; 11 129 however, 
his findings have been variously challenged. Most significantly for 
the question of the tests' predictive power is the indictment that the 
"criteria" which Torrance used to assess the students' later adult 
creativity are actually characteristic of any typical, well-educated 
high-IQ adult.130 Further, the value of associating divergent-think-
ing as assessed either during school years or later with adult crea-
tivity has been challenged; for example, Mansfield and Busse concluded 
that ''few divergent thinking tests show evidence of criterion-related 
validity (in the case of adult professionals). 11 131 In addition, the 
direct relationship between divergent-production test factors and 
"creativity" has been seriously questioned, for example by Kogan and 
Pankove, 1974,132 among others. 
Finally, the discriminant validity of the Torrance Tests (their 
demonstration of measuring discrete "creativity" factors independently 
of other factors such as those in intelligence as measured by tradi-
tional intelligence tests) has been found by Torrance only above the 
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IQ level of 120.133 Where the tests are independent of IQ 1 s at levels 
below 120, they have shown no underlying interrelatedness among sub-
tests which could demonstrate that one identifiable capacity (i.e., 
creativity) independent of intelligence was measured across the sub-
tests .134 
While these challenges to the validity of the Torrance Creative 
Thinking Tests should seriously undermine any complete confidence in 
them, they are still widely used 135 and thought to show 11 sufficient 
evidence of reliability and validity 11 136 to be used as measures of 
divergent-thinking. As emphasized by Treffinger,137 Guilford,138 
Kogan139 and others, however, divergent thinking is itself not syn-
onymous with creativity; many other functions, in addition to 
divergent-thinking, make their contributions, ultimately, to crea-
tivity. 
The Wallach and Kogan Battery has faired rather better than the 
Torrance Tests in validation studies. At least, the W-K Battery has 
been found to exhibit a high degree of relatedness across its sub-
tests, indicating that 11 a fairly unitary phenomenon 11 is being 
measured.140 The battery also appears to exhibit a greater relative 
independence of the measured 11 p!1enomenon 11 from intel 1 igence as as-
sessed by standard IQ measurements.141 With respect to predictive 
validity, however, though a study conducted by Wallach and Wing, 1964, 
appeared to suggest predictive validity for the battery,142 Feldman 1 s 
review of the study found the results to be 11 inconclusive 11 143 due both 
to technical problems within the multi-facted study and to the limited 
range of subjects used. 
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Other instruments used to measure creative potential of students 
include Guilford's measures of divergent thinking144 and Getzels and 
Jackson's creativity battery.145 As Crockenberg has pointed out, 
however, these creativity-related instruments have much in common with 
the Torrance Creative Thinking Tests and hence need not be discussed 
separately here. 
A test which, unlike those mentioned above, relies almost exclu-
sively on visual stimulus items and their perception is the Physiog-
nomic Cue Test, developed by Morris Stein,146 which can be used with 
individuals of any age as it is relatively free of academic or verbal 
thresholds. As interesting as this instrument may be for assessing 
creative sensibilities, it does not seem to tap any of the functions 
operative in creativity beyond immediate perceptual and emotional 
responses and hence is too narrowly limited for wide use. Similarly, 
the often-noted Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Revised 1959) relies heavily 
on visual stimulus items and, while correlating highly and regularly 
with adult creativity, does not present itself as a test of creativity 
such as might be useful in public school settings.147 Further, the 
widely used and researched Remote Association Test (RAT), developed by 
Mednick,148 has significant limitations for use in education due 
specifically to its reliance on verbal stimuli requiring a high con-
centration of information to be available in order for there to be 
meaningful responses. The RAT has been used extensively with adults 
at IPAR and occasionally in school settings at higher grade levels 
where the necessary associative clusters of concepts or words have 
more likely been attained. 
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In summary, then, it can be seen that education does have at its 
disposal today several instruments for possible use in identifying 
creative potential in students, but both predictive and discriminant 
validity remain uncertain. The assertion of Kneller in 1965 that "no 
reliable tests have yet been devised to measure individual creative 
qualities••l49 was reiterated and elaborated upon by Welsh in 1975: 
... the search for an easily administered test of creativity 
that is independent of traditional tests of intelligence has 
not been successfull{ demonstrated by those working within a 
cognitive framework. 50 
The situation remains the same today with respect to instruments which 
can reliably identify an aptitude for creativity in student processes 
or behaviors. 
The modern consensus is beginning to coalesce around an expanded 
conceptualization of creativity as a multi-faceted capacity involving 
both divergent thinking and crystalized and fluid intelligence fac-
tors, with additional contributions from a wide range of personality 
factors.151 While it has long been argued that standardized intelli-
gence tests measure only a limited range of cognitive abilities (six 
to eight of the 120 abilities isolated in Guilford's Structure of the 
Intellect model )152 and hence provide an incomplete picture of stu-
dents' abilities, particularly omitting the "creative areas, 11 153 the 
relevance of intelligence to creativity is by no means obviated. Tor-
ranee, Getzels and Jackson and others have demonstrated that IQ levels 
and creativity levels (as measured by appropriate available tests) are 
not strongly correlated, particularly above the 120 IQ threshold;154 
however, clearly ''a certain amount of intelligence is required for 
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creativity. 11 155 Further, though current creativity-related instru-
ments do not give evidence of providing global measurements of crea-
tivity, they may successfully measure specific aspects of creative 
capacity.156 These two types of instruments (i.e., intelligence and 
11 creativity" tests) together with the personality measures, provide a 
broad spectrum of tests which, in combination, could provide initial 
bases for the nev-1 perspective on "creativity. 11 
The Creative Process 
Follo\'ling immediately in the path of the works by Wallas, Poin-
car~, Patrick, Dewey and others in the first half of the twentieth 
century, Brewster Ghiselin's The Creative Processl57 appeared in 1952, 
bringing to public attention the anecdotal writings of many of the 
eminently creative geniuses of the last two centuries on the subject 
of their own personal processes of creative thinking and creative pro-
duction. Ghiselin proposed a generalized theory of the creative pro-
cess following closely the outline of four stages suggested by Wallas 
and Poincare before him. Although the stages were not necessarily il-
lustrated or illuminated by each of the writers included in Ghiselin's 
volume, rich source material was provided by his work. 
Following the creative experiences and processes described by 
Einstein, Coleridge, Poincar~ and others in Ghiselin's collection, 
Mednick formulated a quite highly articulated theory of the creative 
process which he defined in a somewhat summary fashion as 
•.• tl1e forming of associative elements into new combinations 
which either meet specific requirements or are in so1ne way 
useful. The more mutually remote the elements of the new 
combination, the more creative the process or the solution.158 
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He suggested three methods whereby such associations could be evoked: 
1) serendipity in which the associative elements are 11 evoked con-
tiguously by the contiguous environmental appearance •.• of stimuli 
which elicit these elements; 11 159 2) similarity in which the associa-
tive elements are evoked contiguously as a result of their similarity 
or the similarity of the stimuli eliciting them, and 3) mediation, in 
which elements shared in common by the key associative elements may 
mediate their assocation.160 
In articulating this associative process, Mednick was able to 
indicate, with clear implications, the place of 11 preparation 11 in the 
creative process: to wit, the accumulation of the requisite ideas or 
elements to be thus 11 associated. 11 His description also accounted al-
most graphically for the incidence of multiple, though not necessarily 
11 instantaneous, 11 associations in both fluent and flexible manners 
without the stereotopic response pattern characteristic of the less 
creative individual. Further, Mednick 1 s careful articulation of the 
associative process attained a broader psychological dimension with 
his suggestion of the cognitive or personality styles ( 11 visualizer 11 
and ''verbalizer 11 ) revealed by the manner in which associative process-
es are elicited, which may also, as he indicated, 11 be partly respon-
sible for differential aptitude for creative work in differing 
fields. 11 161 
Although the 11 association of ideas 11 in creative thinking had 
been formulated variously by previous authors, and constitutes only 
55 
one portion of the entire process of conceiving, formulating and pro-
ducing a creative work, Mednick's articulation of the process brought 
practical demonstration and technical handling to the concepts in-
volved. His Remote Association Test (RAT) operationalized his thesis 
in a form which could promote further research162 and contribute to 
the development of modern conceptualization of the processes involved 
in creative thinking. 
It should be noted that such an analytical advance in associa-
tion theory was proposed by Guilford in 1959 and graphically systema-
tized in his Structure of the Intellect model in 1965.163 While Guil-
ford's measures of divergent thinking, derived from his work with the 
Aptitudes Project at the University of Southern California, provided 
test tasks for many of the 120 intelligence factors in the Structure 
of the Intellect model ,164 the specificity of the defined abilities 
and tasks guided his conceptualizations and his methodology along fac-
torial lines. As a result, Guilford's work was directed quite speci-
fically toward a mechanistic concept of steps in problem-solving as 
the basic prototype for creative thinking of all sorts.165 Guilford's 
problem-solving mode1l66 involved the essential elements of Wallas' 
four-stage creative process, which was researched and generally con-
firmed by Patrick between 1935 and 1955.167 Simply rendered, Guil-
ford's model of the process of problem-solving can be seen to parallel 
the Wallas/Patrick four-stage model of creative thinking168 closely, 
particularly considering the double content of "preparation" for 
Wallas/Patrick which included both the gathering of information and 
conscious cogitation aiming at solution or breakthrough. 
Wall as/Patrick 
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FTgure 1. Stages in Wallas/Patrick's creative process model and 
Guilford's problem-solving model ,169 
Guilford contributed a systematic description of the feedback loops 
between steps 2, 3, and 4 and suggested a loop between COGNITION and 
INPUT (omitted in the schematic above) \'lith a "filter" operation in-
serted bet\'leen the two to account for "recognition" of the cognition 
data after its original "cognition," perhaps an unnecessary complexi-
faction. What is cognized need not be transformed into new input to 
be ~-cognized and evaluated. Patrick clearly suggested the occur-
rence of the basic feedback looping complexity in the Wallas stages as 
demonstrated by the artists' and scientists' processes she studied, 
which observation led her to assert that the stages were not adhered 
to in the formally sequential manner implied originally by Wallas.170 
Guilford's diagram also schematically represented the field of stored 
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information (and experience) which underlies the thinking and produc-
tive processes, and with the graphic representation of this field gave 
perhaps more content to the fundamental concept of preparation (as 
basic information and experience gathering and storing) for problem-
solving and creative processes than previous, disparate references to 
it such as Mednick's, Wallas' and Patrick's, and even Dewey's models 
and theories had done. 
Guilford's paradigm, however, probably emphasized reasoning and 
tightly connected logical processes unduly in his schematization of 
the problem-solving process if he wished to represent the "creative" 
process, in general. Several essential features of the creative 
processes of innovations were excluded in the highly rationalistic 
formulation he propounded. For example, the common experience of 
becoming conscious of answers or solutions "suddenly bursting out of 
no where, 11 as if by magic, and the experience of periods of rest or 
complete distraction as a time-lapse often intervening between hard 
1-Jork on the problem area followed by the sudden "illuminating" idea or 
solution seem to be precluded by implication from the logical 11 input 11 -
11cognition11 cycle. These experiences are more clearly recognized and 
implicitly included in Wallas' and Patrick's four-stage concept and 
are more easily accommodated by Mednick 's process of the remote 
association of ideas with the methods he identified as operative in 
its activation. The cognitive framework and methodology used by 
Guilford predisposed his work to a heavier reliance on logical and 
systematic descriptions of operations than might be appropriate in 
representing the "creative process" distinctively. Guilford's allow-
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ance for either convergent or divergent processes as operative in the 
"production" stage does not entirely solve the basically mechanistic, 
"problem-solving" tenor of his model. 
Wallas' four-stage concept was brought into modern perspective 
in 1955 by Patrick's What Is Creative Thinking?l71 in which the author 
analyzed in detail the stages which she had earlier researched and 
found to be accurate descriptions of procedures followed by both 
professional artists and scientists, excepting Wallas' implied strict 
sequential format.172 In What Is Creative Thinking?, the stages of 1) 
preparation, 2) incubation, 3) illumination, and 4) verification or 
revision are described with considerable content references to both 
artistic and scientific work in demonstration of one of Patrick's 
basic premises -- that the creative process is basically the same in 
both areas of work. Containing as it does voluminous references to 
the work of other psychologists and theoreticians, Patrick's text 
appears to be a psychologist's textual version of Rosamond Harding's 
An Anatomy of Inspiration, the Third Edition of \'>'hich appeared in 
1948,173 and provides rich insights into the stages experienced by 
creative individuals as seen through the eyes of a psychologist. With 
Patrick's work, then, the creative process as a variable sequence of 
stages was brought into modern focus as a both active and passive pro-
cess, capacities in each stage of which underlie summative creativity 
in any field. The Wallas/Patrick four-stage model of the creative 
process, with reinforcements from the similarly-based models by Poin-
car§ and Ghiselin174 and Dewey,175 appears to be the model most repre-
sentative of the creative process experienced in the work of profes-
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sional artists and scientists. As such, the \4allas/Patrick model is 
of central importance as a reference point for modern psychological 
and educational research into creativity. 
A fourth theory of the creative process, quite similar in tone 
to Guilford's, was proposed in 1962 by Torrance. Torrance introduced 
his conception of creativity in the form of a simple descriptive 
definition of creativity as ''the process of forming hypotheses, test-
ing hypotheses and communicating the results. 11 176 Fifteen years 
later, Torrance expanded his definition and description with crea-
tivity's being seen 
as the process of sensing problems or gaps in information, 
forming ideas or hypotheses, testing and modifying these hypo-
theses, and communicating the results.177 
In this latter definition, Torrance actually stated a theory of 
a five-stage creative process, with the additional two initial stages 
being implied by the inclusion of "information" in which problems or 
gaps are sensed which leads to the formation of hypotheses. Simply 
diagra~ned, Torrance's vision of the creative process appears to be 
similar to both Guilford's and Wallas/Patrick's, with the exception of 
the final stage of "communication," v1hich was not included in the 
others' theories or models. The inclusion of tr1is fifth stage allowed 
Torrance's concept to advance the theory of the creative process in 
the practical dimension and to fit it more aptly for educative pur-
poses. In fact, the recognition of the specific stage of the communi-
cation of creative production became, in Torrance's hands, a key area 
in which creative students could he guided in bringing their creations 
successfully and profitably to the attention of others so that their 
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work might make positive contributions to their class or group rather 
than problems for themselves in the form of negative peer 
sanctions.178 
Wallas/Patrick 
Preparation 
(and cogitation) 
Incubation 
Illumination 
Verification 
& Elaboration 
Torrance 
Information 
Cognition 
Hypothesis/Idea 
Testing 
Communication 
Guilford 
~ 
Cognition 
Production 
Evaluation 
i 
' 
r-- - - - - - - - -1 ~ - - - ______ 1 __ ~__,._____, 
STORAGE I 1 I 
1---- - - - - - - - __L - - - - - - - - - - - _. _____________ _, 
Figure 2. Stages in 'tJallas/Patrick 1 s creative process model, 
Guilford 1 s problem-solving model and Torrance 1 s theory of the process 
of creating. 
It is important to note that, however, well-suited to the educa-
tional setting, Torrance's view of the creative process shares more 
with the rational-mechanistic, basically problem-solving, model of 
Guilford than it does with the psycho-experimental view of the crea-
tive individual 1 s processes of creation as conceived by Wallas and 
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Patrick. In discussing his conception of the creative process in 
Rewarding Creative Behavior, 1965, Torrance not only qualifies the 
"hypothesis formulating" stages as one of "making guesses 11 179 (a more 
"natural" and comprehensible/acceptable description, he believes), but 
he describes the sub-processes (or looping processes) that naturally 
occur as "investigating, asking questions, manipulating things, making 
(more) guesses and the like. 11 180 vJhile somev-1hat similar to the basic 
problem-solving operations described by Guilford as "search for 
answers" or "seeking for new input information" with "ubiquitous" 
loops into evaluation,181 Torrance's characterization of these pro-
cesses and subprocesses are more distinctly suggestive of trial-and-
error problem-solving operations than is even Guilford's model. 
In sum, while research expanded and insights accumulated con-
cerning the usual steps or stages involved in the creative process, 
the post-Sputnik and the cybernetics and computer revolutions of the 
second half century have tended to predispose conceputalization of 
creativity toward problem-solving techniques and operations as in the 
processes described by Guilford and Torrance. Deriving from in-depth 
conceptions of how breakthrough ideas must occur and the processes 
experienced in the full deliverance of new creative works, Mednick, 
and Wallas and Patrick, propounded fruitful concepts of the distinc-
tively "creative" process, the latter of 'l'thich is based on a consider-
able store of evidence and descriptions from eminently creative indi-
viduals in Western civilization. 
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Additional Essentials in the Process of Creativity 
In addition to the widely researched personality characteristics 
of creative persons, some of the distinctive features of the styles of 
working shared in common by most of the manifestly creative indi-
viduals studied have been singled out by modern researchers bringing 
essential aspects of the creative processes into sharper focus. The 
features most importantly noted converge around the special relation-
ship or interaction which exists between the creative individual and 
his or her work. These features appear to be unique basic elements 
essential to the fruitful process of creative work which produces the 
breakthrough, the novel and useful, the "great" contribution. 
First through her studies of both eminent artists and scien-
tists, Roe observed one essential trait exhibited in common by all the 
artists and scientists: the "driven" personality,182 a "driving 
absorption in their work. 11 183 In Henle 1 s words, this characteristic 
"absorption" is "immersion, 11 184 which she associated with the condi-
tion Newton described as "always thinking about it. 11 185 May describes 
the absorption as "intense" and as responsible for the "encounter 11 l86 
which underlies, in his estimation, all genuine creative activity. 
Second, in her studies of eminent scientists, Roe also observed 
that the scientists shared in common "the rarity of any indication of 
a drive for achievement. 11 187 This latter feature seems to be directly 
related to the characteristic of involvement in creative adventure in 
which the ego is suspended or in descent in importance before the 
objective of the successful completion or "delivery" of the creative 
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work, as implied by Pepinsky's research,188 and the theories of 
May,189 Kris, 190 and others. This feature of ego-lessness charac-
teristic of the absorption or intense involvement in creative work is 
further described by Henle as a state of selflessness in which 
••. the ego lends itself to the work rather than dominating the 
task ••.. The main vectors of genuine thought often do not 
refer to the I with its personal interests; rather they 
represent the structural requirements of the given 
situation.191 
Norbert ·~einer, creator of cybernetics, explained simply: 11 My ideas 
are my masters. 11 192 The involvement is further characterized by Henle 
as "detached devotion. 11 193 
Patrick sheds a wider spectrum of light on this 11 absorption 11 
through her analyses which identify an apparent 11 emotional 11 involve-
mentl94 in the often difficult, up-and-down process of bringing a 
creative and wholly new work to complete form. The emotional involve-
ment is but a testament to the depth of the typical immersion of the 
creative individual in the creative process. The "total personality" 
creates, according to Barronl95 
The 11 intrinsic 11 nature of motivations and goals in genuinely 
11 creative 11 activities is a fourth element in the creative process, as 
brought out by Crutchfield. In his analysis of the selfless, passion-
ate, and total involvement in the process of creation, Crutchfield 
identified the source of both motivation and goals in 11 genuine 11 crea-
tive endeavor as intrinsic to the creative individual and the creative 
work rather than extrinsic: 
... task-involvement in the creative act is not the same as the 
person's seeking to achieve 'creativity' per seas his goal. 
The latter is merely a form of ego-need i""ilWhTCh the person 
strives to create in order to fulfill a certain 
self-conception--or a conception by others--that he is a 
1 creative person. 1 Such deliberate strivings to be 1 ~rgative 1 
are not likely to be conducive to genuine creativity. 9 
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One serious implication of this analysis is the casting of doubt on 
the validity of using external pressures of expectation or 11 direction 11 
to stimulate creativity. As May explains, when creativity is 11 in the 
service of sornething ••• else, 11 197 the intense 11 encounter 11 or 
11 absorption 11 may be lacking, and 11 this is the central feature of many 
kinds of artistic exhibitionism--what Rank calls the artiste 
rnanque. 11 198 
GJven the above considerations of absorption, intense involve-
ment, and the necessity of intrinsic motivation and goals, it would 
seem that freedom to follow one 1 s own line of thinking, one 1 s own pro-
cesses to the ends they entail, is a prerequisite for authentic crea-
tivity; and this freedom to follow one's own thinking would seem to 
imply the precedence of the natural interests of the creative indi-
vi dual, as suggested by the extensive discussions of educators and 
psychologists, including Gowan and Demos,199 Bruner,200 Patrick,201 
and Torrance.202 
Furthermore, the high degree of individuality and independence 
involved in the creative process, including the need to 11 let the mind 
wander, 11 203 combine to suggest hesitations about expectations for 
creativity in group contexts where group planning and group processes 
have the objective of achieving extrinsic goals of producing coopera-
tive solutions and/or products. In fact, while there have been signi-
ficant studies of group procedures, such as brainstorming, suggesting 
positive results,204 deeper analyses of both the processes and the 
products involved in such procedures have led to negative assess-
65 
ments.205 It is interesting to note that, while Parnes advocates the 
use of group brain-storming techniques to stimulate creative problem-
solving, he notes, "By far the greatest percentage of time is spent in 
individual ideation and judgement. 11 206 In their study, "Creativity 
and Personality," Cattell and Butcher point out the predominance of 
"introversion observed particularly among physical scientists" in 
juxtaposition to scientific research conditions today which 
is increasingly a matter of team work, and the leader, or in-
novator, or inventor may appear to be highly dependent on ef-
fective cooperation and even on conventional social skills. 
But even in these conditions and in the field of technology 
and applied research, it has been frequently pointed out ••• 
that the individual, fertile originator remains the crucial 
factor in scientific progress; and this applies even more 
strongly in th7oretical fields, perhaps especially in 
mathematics.20 
Cattell and Butcher go on to quote Van Zeist and Kerr's findings that 
scientific and technical personnel share a "disbelief in egalitarian 
'committee-like' practices in research groups and a need for with-
drawal and cogitation."208 Even more doubtful about the effectiveness 
of group-oriented procedures for stimulating creativity, Getzels and 
Jackson note that MacKinnon's close research observations ''show that 
the group process does not yield proportionately more ideas, more uni-
que ideas, or ideas of higher quality. 11 209 They quote MacKinnon as 
concluding: "In fact, it appears that the group process i nhi bi ts 
creative thinking. 11 210 
The observations concerning creative individuals' responses to 
group-thinking processes would appear to lend credence to the sugges-
ti on that individual, personal interests and processes are fundamental 
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to authentic creativity. In addition, the element of the consider-
able, even strenuous mental and emotional application typically 
involved in creative processes further supports the hypothesis that 
personal interests are at the base of creativity. This element of 
diligent application, which is often exhibited to the point of 11 dogged 
persistence, 11 211 is implied in the several stages outlined in all of 
the significant models of the creative process described previously. 
The initial 11 preparation (and cogitation) 11 ( 11 input 11 or 11 infor-
mation gathering 11 ) stage of this process requires that keen attention 
be applied in order for data to be accumulated and cogitated in their 
full complexity. Patrick described the preparation and cogitation 
stage repeatedly as 11 long and hard work, 11 212 often defeatingly so.213 
As Dewey maintained, inventions, solutions, discoveries rarely occur 
"except to a mind that has previously steeped itself consciously in 
material related to its question, 11 (emphasis added)214 and Helmholtz's 
account of his creative process pointed out the concentrated effort 
involved in the cogitation that is a part of the preparation phase of 
creative work: 
It is always requisite (for a discovery to emerge) that I 
should have turned my problem over on all sides, hither and 
thither, to the point where I could see all its terms and 
complexities in my head and could run through them without 
writing. To bring matters to this point is usually impossible 
1~ithout long preparatory labor.215 
The diligent, absorbed work of "preparation-and-cogitation" ( 11 input 11 
or 11 information 11 ), is actually, as implied by Bruner, akin to 11 prac-
tice, practice, practice, 11 216 for which continuous self-application is 
required. 
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This level of concentrated work is needed not only in the 
initial preparation-cogitation stage (or the input, information stage 
followed by cognition) but, after the breakthrough or solution is 
achieved, in the final stage of "verification" ("testing," "evalua-
tion," or "revision"). According to Patrick, "The final stage of 
revision or verification .•• is typically unpleasant and involves pro-
1 onged hard work. 11 217 Further, Patrick notes: "Many persons become 
so discouraged in this final stage that they either abandon the whole 
project or else produce a second rate product. 11 218 
Considering the effort that must be expended in absorption with 
the genuinely creative work, it would seem that, especially for the 
youthful, potentially creative individual, sufficient personal 
involvement would most naturally derive from personal curiosity, 
intrigue and interest; thus, the freedom required for creative activi-
ty would imply an allowance for even the young creator to follow per-
sonal bents and fascinations.219 
Inspiration Through Modern Eyes 
In the treatments of creativity through the 25 centuries preced-
ing the present, illumination or inspiration in the process of crea-
tivity was generally accepted as evidence of special, even divine, 
giftedness but it was otherwise little analyzed. With the works of 
Poincare, Wallas and others early in the present century and with the 
popularization of the concepts involved in the creative process by 
Ghiselin's work in 1945, the place and character of inspiration in the 
creative experience began to be demarked and described in some 
detail. A full accounting has not as yet, however, been delivered. 
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As represented in the modern W a 11 as/Patrick creativity model 
(Fig. 2), the central creative stage of "inspiration" or "illumina-
tion" is generally directly preceded by a period or phase of "incuba-
tion'' in which the creator takes a rest from the absorbing work in 
which he or she has been engaged. This latter stage is described and 
psychologically analyzed by Patrick: 
After continuous work on a problem many inhibitions and inter-
ferences are set up. Relaxation allows these to die out, and 
permits a fresh approach to be made. When an inspiration 
comes in the midst of conversation or during other unrelated 
work, it is probable that some unnoticed stimulus has provoked 
a return to the original problem, which is solved immediatel~ 
because of the absence of the old conflicts and confusions.2 0 
Here, Patrick seems to be drawing implicitly on "association" to ac-
count for the spontaneous return to the previous subject of creative 
absorption and to be relying on some assumed giveness of "solution" or 
breakthrough which is immediately seen when the system is refreshed 
and confusions have faded away. Although Patrick's explanation of the 
spontaneous shift of attention seems apt, the assumption of the ab-
sence of disturbing elements and the consequent immediacy of insight 
does not seem sufficient; however, the suggestion of an interim con-
necting condition allows for the promise of deeper conceptual penetra-
tion into the creative process than previous views seem to offer. 
In some of the nineteenth and early twentieth century discus-
sions by creative individuals, a subtle progression of linkages 
between unconcerted "incubation" and sudden "inspiration" was various-
ly irnplied--for example, Poincare suggested that ''delicate intuitions" 
at the subliminal level are operative in "incubation" in his 
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experience and led directly to the ultimate "illumination." His des-
cription of these intuitions is highly suggestive: 
The subliminal self is in no way inferior to the conscious 
self; it is not purely automatic; it is capable of discern-
ment; it has tact, delicacy; it knows how to choose, to 
divine ...• It knows better how to divine than the conscious 
self, since it succeeds where that has failed.221 
Poincare described in more detail this "choosing" or "divining": 
•.• the word (to choose) is perhaps not wholly exact. It makes 
one think of a purchaser before whom are displayed a large 
number of samples, and who examines them, one after the other, 
to make a choice. Here the samples would be so numerous that 
a whole lifetime would not suffice to examine them. This is 
not the actual state of things. The sterile combinations do 
not even present themselves to the mind of the inventor. 
Never in the field of his consciousness do combinations appear 
that are not really useful, except some he rejects but which 
have to some extent the characteristics of useful combina-
tions. All goes on as if the inventor were an examiner for 
the second degree who would only have to question the candi-
dates who had passed a previous examination.222 
As promising as this description is, Poincar~ did not attempt to ac-
count, in any systematic way, for the existence of the combinations 
among which intuition chooses; they appear to be simply assumed 
"givens." In a way foreshadowing Patrick's analysis, Poincar~ seems 
to have assumed somehow that breakthrough solutions exist prior to 
their conscious recognition, which view has been implied throughout 
the long history of philosophical and critical analysis of creativi-
ty. His vision included, however, the operation of subliminal ''deli-
cate intuition'' which presumably would link consciousness with the 
preconscious state of things (or events) in the "incubation" stage. 
Apparently, in the preconscious "incubation" stage, data is intercon-
nected to different degrees of completeness, as it were; and intui-
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tion, somehow tuned to "sufficient completeness for solution," divines 
those "sufficient" combinations of data and therewith experiences "il-
lumination." 
Poincare 1 s creative "subliminal self," of which he was obviously 
aware operating within himself, seems to have been advanced little to-
ward the clarification of its implied operation as a subtle level of 
c o g n i t i on or c on s c i o u s n e s s i n " i n c u b at i on " and " i 11 um i n at i on 11 by 
modern psychological work in the field of creativity until Arieti 1 s 
work, Creativity: The Magic Synthesis, in 1976. In this text, Arieti 
introduced a new concept of a "preconscious to subtly-conscious" pro-
cess which he termed "amorphous cognition. 11 223 This cognition has as 
its object the "endocept" which is a "primitive organization of past 
experiences, perceptions, memory traces, and images of things and 
movements. 11 224 According to Arieti, the endocept is not "easily 
recognizable 11 225 but can be "felt" by some "as an atmosphere, an in-
tuition, a 1 global 1 experience that cannot be divided into 
parts .... 11 226 Arieti postulated that "intuitional knovlledge, 11 which 
has often been linked to creativity, may be "endoceptual knowl-
edge."227 Further, as "a large part of our conceptual life tends to 
fuse with an endoceptual counterpart, or to transmute into endoceptual 
forms ••• , 11 228 Arieti went on to posit that this conceptual-
endoceptual fusing or transmuting is a part of the "cognitive activity 
that eventually unfolds into the creative process. 11 229 
Arieti 1 s conception of amorphous, endoceptual cognition seems to 
account more systematically than previous theories for both intuitive 
experiences in the creative process and the apparent prior existence 
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or 11 given-ness 11 of the breakthrough ideas or solutions suddenly 
cognized in "illumination." In addition, Arieti offered a synoptic 
view of the creative individual's shifting of levels of cognition, 
which occurs in any of the several stages of the creative processes 
implied by Poincar~ and others: 
(the creative person) has seen (or "felt") a defect, or 
incompleteness, in the usual order of concepts, or has some 
other motive for dissatisfaction with it. Thus he brings part 
of his mental activity back to the stage of amorphous cogni-
tion, to that great melting pot when suspense and indeter-
minacy reign, where simultaneity fuses with sequential time 
and unsuspected transmutations occur.230 
Arieti's concept of amorphous cognition appears, most essential-
ly, descriptive of the subtly-conscious or subliminal processes in 
"incubation" which can be further described as comprising "an indeter-
minate activity in search of a form, a groping for some definite 
structure. 11 231 This description appears to fit well, for example, 
with the characteristic experience of incubation in which the creative 
individual is somehow subconsciously preoccupied while he or she is 
about other activities. Arieti indicated that from "incubation" 
amorphous cognition itself leads directly to "illumination" (though he 
suggested that this is only one of many possible linkages): '~hen a 
suitable form is found, this activity is transformed into a creative 
work, at a more or less advanced stage of production''232 
With Arieti, then, we find a very modern psychological descrip-
tion of "incubation" and "inspiration." In both of these stages of 
the creative process, the sources of the content and the conscious 
operations themselves are within the individual as stored primitive or 
unrefined trace patterns of experiences of all kinds, together with 
72 
natural neurophysiological processes. "Inspiration" appears to be on 
the threshold of becoming recognized as a potentially conscious, al-
beit subtly-conscious, process. 
Genius in the Age of Testing 
After the mid-point in the twentieth century, the question of 
"genius" did not preoccupy a significant number of researchers. Ac-
cording to Gowan and Demos in 1964, " ••• the word genius has gone out 
of fashion •••• "233 Further, they suggest, 
••• this is a natural and a hopeful development in a new 
science for it means we are beginning to disregard the spec-
tacular and root our theory in the more useful study of larger 
groups."234 
The "larger groups" are identified and made available for research, 
today, by intelligence tests. 
Although intelligence testing may have had the potential of 
obviating undue emphasis on the exceptionally or spectacularly talent-
ed or intellectually-gifted student as demonstrated by performance and 
obvious superiority of gifts, it may have done so in counterproductive 
ways. First, with the IQ metric available, and following the studies 
in the early part of the century, the category "genius" did not vanish 
from use altogether but was rather installed as the generic term, 
along with "gifted," for individuals with high !Q's (over 150 on the 
Stanford-Binet scale) with a considerable narrowing of the term's 
meaning. As Thurstone noted in 1952, 
••• the Quiz Kids are often referred to as geniuses. They 
would undoubtedly score high in memory functions, including 
incidental memory and rote memory. But it is doubtful whether 
they are also fluent in producing original ideas.235 
73 
Genius and creativity were technically and decisively separated when 
studies by Getzels and Jackson236 and Torrance237 established that the 
IQ level of 120 was the threshold beyond which intelligence and crea-
tivity appear to be entirely independent. The implications of this 
were spelled out by Torrance: 
••• identifying as gifted those students who score in the upper 
20 percent of an intelligence test [about IQ 120 for Torrance] 
is to disregard 70 percent of the most creative, as similarly 
identified by a creativity test.238 
Second, the accessibility to teachers and educators in general 
of IQ scores magnified the importance of the narrow range of student 
capabilities measured by the intelligence tests and simultaneously 
diminished the importance of creative abilities. The results may be 
decided inequities in educational opportunities,239 an inequality per-
haps more generalized and extreme than the one the IQ metric was pur-
ported to be able to correct. 
Genius has, since its origin as a concept, been identified with 
superlative human capacities, and particularly superlative creativity 
in the arts and sciences. Further, the modern consensus appears to be 
that "the abilities involved in being creative are universal, i.e., 
everybody possesses these abilities to some degree •••• "240 For these 
reasons it would seem exceptional that the current definition of 
genius should so clearly omit creativity. The exclusion from the 
classification of "genius" of those without superior giftedness in the 
highly circumscribed area of ''intelligence" as assessed by modern 
intelligence or IQ tests, however, appears to be a result of cir-
cumstances involved in testing and measurement in this modern age. 
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In the field of testing, which has won much confidence in the 
twentieth century, the testing of intelligence has proved itself to be 
much more dependable and useful than the testing of creativity. IQ 
tests measure abilities which can be definitively assessed by single 
established-right-answer methods, lending the credibility of validity 
and reliability to the instruments. Further, predictive power for IQ 
tests is also insured by the fact that the test instruments subject 
test-takers to school-related methods and measures in order to predict 
future success in a school or professional setting where tasks and 
objectives are based on the same fundamentally convergent-thinking and 
information-retrieval methods as the testing instrument itself. 
In contrast to these advantages, the test instruments used to 
measure creativity which have been developed to date are comparatively 
weak in validity, reliability and predictive power. Not only are as-
sessments still highly subjective and variable, but the capacities 
tested are in no way identical with ultimate manifest creativity. 
First, aspects of creativity are so divergent in character as to be 
almost impossible to anticipate or adequately judge. Even when crea-
tive individuals are in the ultimate position of performing creative 
work, " ••. society has often failed to recognize creative products 
until a generation or two after the persons who created them have 
lived. 11 241 And further, as Fabun noted in 1970, "At the time of their 
introduction, most original ideas have met with ridicule, disapproval, 
opposition, or downright persecution. 11 242 
Second, the processes involved in creativity appear to be too 
subtle to be, as yet, accessible to direct measurement or assessment, 
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so only various somewhat artificial productions or superficial 
process-identifiers are available currently for use as test items 
which are, by definition, not indices of genuine creativity. It would 
appear, therefore, that tests to measure genuine creativity as yet 
fall short of the mark. 
• 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Summary 
In order to obtain an in-depth vision of the 11 mysterious 11 human 
experience of intellectual breakthroughs and creativity, this study 
has examined the conceptions of creativity dominant in four highly in-
novative periods in Western civilization: ancient Greece, the Italian 
Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment in Europe and the twentieth 
century. 
From the earliest literary records of Western civilization, 
there has been evidence of man's sensitivity to the mysterious experi-
ence of his own creativity. Nearly 3000 years ago, the extraordinary 
Homer repeatedly attributed his inspirations in the creation of both 
The Iliad and The Odyssey to the gods and muses. The earliest Greek 
philosophers represented their treatises as being nearly direct dicta-
tions from spiritual sources. By the time of Plato, the assumption 
that creative motivation and direction issued immediately from supra-
rational sources had been a long-standing tradition as well as a part 
of the very fabric of philosophical, poetic and dramatic form. Plato 
recognized the evocative power of many such inspired works but, as 
sensitive as he was to the gifted and the gifts, he could not accept 
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the inexplicable, hence non-rational, offerings of inspired verse and 
drama either as "truth's" or as experiences appropriate for personal 
development and good citizenship. For Plato, in fact, this very 
combination of emotional power and non-rationality constituted the 
danger for the public of the "free" creative works of men. For the 
sake of stability and the strength of the republic, Plato had to 
exclude from the state all gifted producers of inspired non-rational 
experiences. Rule and moderation, not excesses of pleasure and emo-
tion, were proper goals for the ideal citizenry of the republic. 
In spite of Plato's harsh injunction against inspired works, 
however, creative philosophical and other literary works continued to 
be produced in ancient Greece, beyond the precincts of Plato's dream-
ed of Republic or State; and the creative individuals continued to at-
tribute the sudden and surprising influxes of insight and inspiration 
in their conscious experiences to the obvious source--not, themselves, 
but some external power above and beyond them in knowledge and po-
tency. 
By the fifteenth century, events had combined to elicit unrival-
led creative energy, production and accomplishment from the supremely 
gifted in Italy's city-states. Oil and fresco painting, sculpture, 
poetry, philosophy, criticism and drama all flourished in the intense 
reflection of light and life emitted from the discovered remnants of 
Rome's great past. The Italian Renaissance cast its spell of crea-
tivity over centuries to come. At the center of the emanations was a 
Christianized Neoplatonism in which man was reconceived as endowed 
from birth with natural creative powers which only needed to be 
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unfolded through active creative, productive endeavor. The site of 
mysterious creative illuminations or inspirations was, for creative 
individuals in the Renaissance, localized "within" the creative indi-
vidual, and those most richly endowned with "genius" were esteemed as 
no less than God-like or divine. 
As the Renaissance cities of Italy continued for two centuries 
to build and flourish in the currents of rebirth, creativity was 
installed at the zenith of human experience and promise. With the 
source of creative inspiration and insight having been identified as, 
in varying degrees, within every man's own nature (ultimately, it was 
thought, elevating him to become the very creator of himself), man's 
gifts, no matter how exceptional or extreme, were conceived as self-
transcending and full of excellence. Through the Neoplatonism of the 
Renaissance, the fact that inspiration remained wholly inexplicable in 
anything but non-rational, spiritual terms caused no hesitations of 
reason and the fact that "genius" was observed to be somewhat touched 
with the unreasonable, with madness, itself caused no hesitation in 
analysis or act. The splendor of creative power ruled the times and 
demonstrated the heights to which creative attainment could climb in 
the encouraging climate. Creativity thus became the summit of human 
experience and supremely creative individuals the idols of the age. 
The eighteenth century for Europe was a century of profound 
awakening to new visions of the powers of reason and artistic expres-
sion, as is suggested by its designation as "the Age of Enlighten-
ment." France, the leading country of Europe's Enlightenment, was 
deeply embued with Cartesian rationalism from the 1600s and the 
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attendant great drama, poetry, and critical writings of French 
Classicism from that century. Led by Boileau, Classicist criticism, 
with its reliance on logical method, rule, deduction and basic 
principles, dominated the critical works of both France and England 
during most of the years of the Enlightenment. 
The fundamental principle ruling the arts for sixteenth century 
Classicists was "imitation," and results of imitative arts during the 
Enlightenment were satisfying enough to obscure, to an extent, the 
contradiction between "pure imitation," as the perfect method of bril-
1 iant artistic accomplishment, and the exceptional effective results 
possible through often thoroughly "inexplicable" means or methods--the 
ever-present non-rational element in creative fine arts. Boileau led 
the later Classicists to recognize this element when he asserted, 
quite like Plato, that the poet not under divine influences at birth 
could never produce works of the highest order. The clarity of French 
Enlightenment ratonalism brought the phrase "je ne sais quoi" ("I 
don't know what 11 ) into service as the suggestive, if not wholly 
revelatory, description both of the quality of the brilliant work and 
also of the element of greatness in the "born" genius. 
Following Boileau, the French rationalist critics, Bouhours and 
Dubas, penetrated further into the experience of artists• non-
rational processes and introduced the concepts of 11 delicatesse" (sen-
sitivity) and 11 indistinctness 11 as key elements in the artists• crea-
tive processes and in the appreciators• experiences. Alongside reason 
and rule, ''feeling" and "being moved" were acknowledged as motive 
forces in creativity and aesthetic experience. 
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The surest voice in English Enlightenment aesthetics was that of 
the Neoplatonist, Shaftesbury, who raised creative genius even above 
the previous heights of divine, inborn gifts of artistic creativity. 
Shaftesbury saw in artistic creation a replication of nature's own es-
sential foment of productive changes and recognized artistic creative-
ness underlying intuitional understanding as the only technique for 
truly comprehending nature in its essence. This, for Shaftesbury, was 
the quality of genius. The basis of "knowledge" here shifted from 
logic and the deductive rules of reason to the suprarational faculty, 
intuition. Shaftesbury further articulated the formative role of 
imagination in creative enterprise, bringing "inspiration" into nearly 
conscious, voluntary control by the creative individual. 
The Enlightenment's high conception of the inexplicable, non-
rational quality of superlative creative productions was summed up by 
Immanuel Kant's final suggestion that the genius "does not himself 
know how the 1 ideas 1 for (his creation) have entered his head ••• ,"243 
and that it is in the nature and power of this non-rational element of 
genius to give "the rule to art."244 Further, Kant gave one of the 
first psychological descriptions of the difference between creative 
genius and scientific giftedness asserting that the latter deserved 
the highest distinction because its work was rational and capable of 
being communicated to others (i.e. was "knowledge") while artistic 
creative processes and products could not be fully explicated or com-
municated (i.e. were not "known" or understood). 
Although beginning on a strongly rationalistic footing, the Age 
of Enlightenment brought into play observational approaches to crea-
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tivity which revealed important psychological elements, such as imagi-
nation's role in inspiration and emotion's role in providing internal 
motivation and directon. Genius continued to be conceived as inborn, 
but its attributes were more clearly distinguished than previously, 
including acknowledgement of the inexplicable arrival of ideas and 
their frequently experienced quality of being laws unto themselves. 
Further, while genius continued to be directly identified with 
artistic creativity, scientific giftedness was distinguished as 
rational and communicable, and this distinction implied an unanalyzed 
dissimilarity of productive process. The laurel for heights of human 
achievement was divided in this Age: early, the Neoplatonist 
Shaftesbury followed the Renaissance's lead and enthroned creative 
genius as the epitome of human experience; later, the idealist Kant 
enthroned scientific endeavor as the zenith of human enterprise. 
The times proceeded with increasing dedication of energies along 
the lines of scientific advancement and high valuation of intellectual 
rationality over all, ultimately to usher in the first half of the 
twentieth century, deeply embued with observational predisposition, 
objectivity orientation and research mindedness. The twentieth cen-
tury was also given a special forward thrust for creativity theory by 
the work of Galton in the mid-nineteenth century with its broad-based 
correlational studies and its close association of genius with both 
creativity and intellectual giftedness. The two directions proved 
significant for the new century's concepts of creativity and genius. 
Early in the twentieth century, statistical and experimental 
methodologies combined to produce intelligence tests. Due to the 
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implied association of intellectual endownment (giftedness) and crea-
tivity (genius), exceptionally intellectually gifted students, as 
identified by intelligence (IQ) tests, were promptly labelled 
"geniuses," as in the early works of Terman and his associates. In 
time, however, "genius" lost nearly all articulated or assumed refer-
ence to creativity, as intelligence tests were the identifiers of high 
IQ and genius, but those who scored high in IQ often proved to be 
neither obviously innovative nor outstandingly creative. 
As the century got underway, the early experimental work on 
intelligence tests, as well as Terman 1 s massive study of young 
geniuses, involved observation of various traits of personality, 
behavior, background, etc., which data formed the basis for the 
specialized study of personalities of the exceptionally endowed. 
These studies multiplied in the second half of the twentieth century. 
In the midst of the surging interest in exceptional intelligence 
and genius early in the twentieth century, attention was drawn to the 
"mysterious" process by which scientists and artists came to their 
breakthroughs by the works of Poincare and Wallas, both of whom sug-
gested a similar four-stage process to be operative. The four-stage 
processes included two reassuringly rational, explainable, stages 
(1-preparation and 4-verification) and two more mysterious, non-
rational stages {2-incubation and 3-illumination). The stages of 
creative work were soon recognized as generally the same in all crea-
tive fields from science and mathematics to art and literature. 
Through these early systematic treatments, the entire creative process 
was somewhat demystified. 
83 
Creativity theory in the second half of the twentieth century 
was given an unprecedented upsurge in attention as a result of the 
1950 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association by 
J.P. Guilford when he assailed his fellow-psychologists with his 
vision of the 11 appalling neglect 11 of the subject of creativity in the 
field of psychology. Studies sprang up on all sides, with particular 
concentrations in the areas of personality traits of creative indi-
viduals, creativity tests and the creative process. No little extra 
impetus was given to the interest in creativity when Sputnik was 
launched in 1957, alerting the entire American nation to the need for 
"more creativity," particularly in the sciences and in technological 
fields. 
In-depth studies of the creative personality began to identify 
the anomalous personality and behavior patterns of creative indi-
viduals and to promote the first serious and broad-spectrum studies of 
these divergencies, their effects, and (surprisingly) their possible 
necessity. The special difficulties these personality proclivities 
(including non-conformity) created for the creative individuals from 
childhood in school settings among peers with more normal traits and 
behavior patterns became a serious focus of attention among research-
ers, as did the possible personal, societal and national costs asso-
ciated with the thwarting of creativity. 
Further, however 11 out of tune 11 the divergent behaviors and pro-
cesses of creative individuals were with general group processes, and 
however difficult creative persons were, as a consequence, to handle 
in group situations such as the regular American classroom, it 
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became apparent that the singular patterns of creative persons were 
partially responsible for the achievement of innovation and the 
successful production of the new creative work. As a result, 
psychologists and educators began to conceive education's roles with 
respect to creative students as more supportive, facilitative and 
constructively guidance-oriented than previous conceptions had 
envisioned. 
A significant portion of Guilford's landmark Address dealt with 
the inadequacy of the widely-used intelligence tests to measure speci-
fic or general qualities of creativity. His analysis included sugges-
tions for tasks which might be employed to measure the capacities or 
aptitudes related to creativity according to his detailed Structure of 
Intellect model. Within a decade, Torrance and his colleagues at the 
University of Minnesota had produced their battery of tests known as 
the Minnesota Test for Creativity based centrally on the capacity of 
divergent-thinking as defined by Guilford. The Minnesota Test was 
soon broadened and reproduced as the Torrance Tests of Creative 
Thinking. Other creativity tests were developed during these years, 
including tests similar to Torrance's (The Wallace and Kogan Battery, 
the Getzels and Jackson Battery, and the Guilford divergent-thinking 
tests) and other types of tests (the Barron-Welsh Art Scale, Stein's 
Physiognomic Cue Test, and Mednick's Remote Association Test). Most 
of the creativity measures developed after the mid-century have been 
widely tested and generally fall somewhat short of strong reliability 
and predictive and discriminant validity. The Torrance, Wallach and 
Kogan, and Getzels and Jackson Batteries are the creativity tests most 
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widely used and appear to provide only suggestive indications of crea-
tive capacity. 
The creative process received in-depth attention after the mid-
century, primarily through adaptations of Wallas• earlier four-stage 
model (preparation, incubation, illumination and verification) ori-
ginally validated by Patrick. Guilford 1 s similar four-stage model 
provided a more mechanistic interpretation of the stages identified by 
Guilford as input, cognition, production and evaluation; in Guilford's 
model, however, the storage of information and retrieval loops were 
given the clearly active description required to account for both 
problem-solving and creating. Torrance developed yet another varia-
tion, adding the significant fifth stage of 11 communication 11 to the 
general model. 
The Wallas/Patrick model, with its two non-rational stages 
(2-incubation and 3-illumination) appears to articulate the experi-
ential qualities of the basic stages of creativity more aptly than 
Guilford's or Torrance's more mechanistic paradigms. The appropriate-
ness of the inclusion of the non-rational experiences in the Wallas/ 
Patrick process model is validated by the sensitive suggestions given 
in Poincare's description of his processes, which are not unlike those 
of many other eminently creative individuals. Further validation is 
added by the most recent psychological analysis of the subtlest 
aspects of creativity (the arrival, through vague processes of 
incubation, at illumination) by Arieti. 
The wide range of extensive analytical and theoretical work in 
recent years by educators and psychologists has further identified 
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significant aspects of the creative personality and the creative pro-
cess which shed increased light on creativity as a whole. The special 
absorption and drivenness of the creative personality at work, 
characterized by ego-less dedication toward intrisically interesting 
and important goals, provides a focus of attention for educators and 
psycholgists alike with significant ramifications for such considera-
tions as the utility of group-thinking and brain-storming processes in 
promoting creativity and the need to allow students freedom to explore 
personal interests in the classroom setting and beyond. 
Two additionally important considerations emerge from modern 
research which psychologists and educators must ponder concerning the 
identification of and education for creativity. First, early signs of 
even the greatest ultimate innovativeness, such as Charles Darwin's, 
are mysteriously absent, even to retrospective vision. Second, ac-
cording to modern informed thought, the trait or combination of traits 
of creativity are normally distributed across the entire population, 
and therefore it has been asserted that "the abilities involved in 
being creative are universal."245 
Finally, in the recent few decades, "genius 11 has arrived at a 
rather restrictively delimited definition due to the prevalence and 
predictive power of intelligence tests as used in the psychological 
and educational settings. Genius is identified as an IQ of 150 or 
above on the Stanford-Binet scale or its equivalent on other tests 
scales. Creativity, which until recently was a significant, if not 
the only, factor in establishing an individual as a "genius," has all 
but dropped entirely out of view as related to genius, due especially 
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to the fact that IQ test scores over 120 have repeatedly been demon-
strated to be independent of creativity as measured (however uncer-
tainly) by creativity tests and, of the most creative students in 
school, 70 percent have IQ's below 120. As IQ tests began to dominate 
the modern educational setting, their initial correction of undue 
emphasis on spectacular individual performance may have ultimately 
resulted in a new emphasis on Quiz Kid geniuses, with a resulting 
disregard of and under-service thereby to 70 percent of the most 
creative students in the schools. 
Conclusions and Implications 
From the study that has been completed, several conclusions can 
be drawn with implications for future research and educational appli-
cations. 
Over the centuries, creativity and intelligence have been 
variously separated and combined, resulting in a continuing confusion 
between the two and inconsistency in their treatment. The use of the 
term "genius" demonstrates the issue. While previously the term had 
been reserved nearly exclusively to denote eminent creativity, at 
present "genius" is used in the fields of psychology and education as 
the generic descriptor for exceptionally high intelligence or IQ. At 
the same time, the suggested separation of creativity from intel-
1 igence in this revised use of "genius'' is gainsaid by the explicit 
association of the two in the current conventional usage of the term 
to mean "excepti anal intellectual and creative power. 11 246 
Further, with intelligence tests holding unprecedented authority 
in assessment in the educational environment, achievement across the 
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full range of subjects is construed to be directly related to intelli-
gence; where IQ and achievement levels are at variance, the relative 
terms of "under-" and "over-achiever" have been used to "explain" the 
discrepancies. The possible contribution or effect of creativity in 
either case has been generally ignored. Ultimately, creativity has 
been implicitly subsumed under the dominant category of intelligence 
with even creative excellence itself being casually assumed to reflect 
high IQ or over-achievement. 
In view of the confusions resulting from the nonsystematic 
separation and combination of creativity and intelligence, and the 
commonly implicit disregard of creativity altogether, it appears at 
this point to be vital to distinguish creativity definitively from 
intelligence. As intelligence is highly rewarded in the culture at 
this time, and creativity appears to be both exceptionally important 
and implicitly thwarted, the distinguishing features of each need to 
be brought to clear demonstration so that the promotion of each can be 
addressed incisively. The first step in distinguishing creativity 
from intelligence must be the development of a definitive concept of 
creativity based on its unique features and attributes. 
Research trends to date suggest a broad and inclusive conceptua-
1 ization of creativity as a multifaceted capacity involving the intel-
ligence factors of divergent-thinking and crystallized and fluid 
intelligence, along with a wide range of personality factors. This 
concept of multifacetedness may ultimately be refined to a fruitful 
and definitive characterization of creativity, in general; however, 
viewed within these intellectual and psychological parameters, the 
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specific and unique factors of creativity may actually be obscured. 
For example, crystallized intelligence factors appears to be funda-
mental to both intelligence and creativity, and fluidity is, in and of 
itself, often a subjective judgement and the factor may be 
characteristic of many mental operations in addition to those involved 
in creativity. As a result, these factors would appear to be more 
promising for 11 describing 11 creativity than for 11 discriminating" crea-
tivity from intelligence or other mental capacities. Similarly, psy-
chological traits such as non-conformity and driven-ness of personali-
ty are characteristic of many persons other than the highly creative, 
so their use in developing a distinct profile for identification of 
creative personalities may be ultimately limited. 
The heart of the issue of developing a discriminative definition 
of creativity seems to be in selecting the most promising point of 
departure and it would appear that focusing on the unique aspects of 
the "creative process 11 itself should reveal the most definitive 
features of creativity. The most useful model of the creative process 
to date appears to be the Wallas/Patrick four-stage model. Central in 
the process is the stage of illumination in which the unique 
experience of the creative "breakthrough," the "decidedly new and 
effective vision," is experienced. Although certainly there must be 
unique attributes to the creative sub-processes involved in the stages 
of preparation and verification which must be researched, the unique 
mental operations and experiences involved in creative incubation and 
illumination seem to be the sites at which the most unique features of 
creativity must be isolated, defined, and ultimately distinguished 
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from other mental operations which it shares in common with general 
intelligence. Arieti's proposals of endoceptual processes with their 
suggested natural organizational structure and subtle connections ap-
pear to be promising preliminary steps. The work needs to be filled 
out and more completely ramified. Additionally, recent neurophysio-
logical findings must be reviewed and brought into relation with the 
psychological and mental processes involved in creativity where 
relevant and if possible. 
Once a finely discriminative definition of creativity has been 
achieved, a battery of tests must be developed and refined to assess 
creative capacity as distinct both from other mental capacities and 
from other patterns of psychological styles, as well. For example, it 
seems clear that while the capacities of gaining fluid and in-depth 
access to rich reservoirs of retrievable experience and of sustaining 
intense involvement, persistent self-application, independence of 
mind, and so forth are necessary intellectual and psychological attri-
butes of the creative individual, they seem to function as the back-
ground or intellectual/psychological topography necessary for the 
manifestation of creativity rather than as creativity itself. A 
definitive test of creative capacity would have to assess precisely 
those traits which function in bringing about the conscious cognition 
of previously unknown or unrecognized links between the current un-
satisfied or problematic situation and the new apt and satisfying 
resolution. 
Until such a definitive and discriminative test has been 
devised, it would seem that the current multifaceted conception of 
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creativity provides the best clues to the general characteristics of 
the capacity. Creativity, conceived in this way, would seem to be 
accessible to measurement by a combination of currently available 
creativity and intelligence tests together with personality 
measurements for the purpose of initial identification, albeit a 
tentative one, of potentially creative individuals. At the present, 
creativity tests are generally quite unpredictive and therefore are, 
by themselves, insufficient measures of real creative capacity; 
however, they may be more suggestive of creativity-specific capacities 
than either intelligence tests or psychological measurements alone 
and, as such, would be a key component in a combination-test program 
for creativity where such testing appears to be necessary. 
Finally, serious consideration needs to be given to the recent 
suggestions of psychologists and educational researchers that 
creativity may well be a trait normally distributed in varying degrees 
across the entire population and that early signs of great creative 
powers may continue to be indiscernable. If stultified creativity 
entails the personal, social and national costs that have been 
hypothesized, the most important concern for educators of the present 
may be how to facilitate the growth and development of creativity of 
all students throughout their entire educational careers. 
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